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In the law schools and in the journals of legal scholarship, much at-
tention is given to tort doctrines and to the pressures for changing them
which have been brought to bear by changes in our patterns of living and
working.' While statutes of limitation are by no means ignored by legal
scholars, their relevance to tort doctrine and litigation strategy are not as
carefully explored as, for example, damages rules2 and (at least by' some
scholars) the role of the liability insurance policy.3 One reason for this
lack of emphasis on the relevance of statutes of limitation is, undoubtedly,
variations among the several jurisdictions. These variations are so consid-
erable that the standard treatises and casebooks can do little more than
make mention of them in extremely general terms.4
*Much of the research for this study was made possible under the terms of
an Instructional Improvement Grant awarded to a grateful author during the sum-
mer of 1967 by the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, pursuant to a
recommendation of the UMC Instructional Improvement Grants Committee, Dr.
Herbert W. Schooling, Chairman. The objective of the grant is the development
of materials which will better enable law students to become familiar with the
increasing number of statutory provisions which affect or change traditional tort
liability.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. A.B., Yale University,
1948; LL.B. with Specialization in International Affairs, Cornell University, 1953;
LL.M. (honours) Victoria University of Wellington (N.Z.), 1954; member, New
York Bar.
1. See, e.g., WALTER E. MEYER RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF LAW, DOLLARS,
DELAY AND THE AUTOMOBILE VICTIM (1968); KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PRO-
TECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965); CONARD, MORGAN, PRATT, VOLTZ &
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE Eco-
NOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964); BLUM & KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPEC-
TIVES OF A PRIVATE LAw PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965);
EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am"
INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954); Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Keeton, Products Liability-the Nature and Extent of
Strict Liability, 1964 ILL. L. REV. 693 (1964); Franklin, Replacing te Negligence
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967).
2. See, e.g., PROSSER & SMITH, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 611-618 (4th
ed. 1967); GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 408-511 (1959)'.
3. See, e.g., PROSSER & SMITH, Op. cit. supra note 2 at 689-733; GREGORY
& KALVEN, op. cit. supra note 2 at 550-609; Dodge, An Injured Party's Rights Under
an Automobile Liability Policy, 38 IowA L. 'REv. 116 (1952); and James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
4. The standard treatise gives the limitations aspect of a torts claim barely
one page of discussion. PROSSER, TORTS 147 (3rd ed. 1964). In their splendid three
volume treatise, Harper and James mention the limitations problm just twice,
(171)
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Despite the casual treatment thus accorded statutes of limitation,
it is clear that no other single factor can so decisively insulate a defendant
from tort liability. The statutes of limitation of a particular jurisdiction
and the modes of application are, therefore, significant factors in any
analysis of a tort problem.
Whether it is an action for assault and battery, an action for negligent
misrepresentation of the potential of oil properties,6 an action for mal-
practice of a physician7 an action for injuries sustained by an employee
in the course of his employment s or an action for wrongful death, 9 the
appropriate statute of limitation may completely bar recovery in a case
where liability is otherwise clear.
For purposes of analysis, the relationships between statutes of lim-
itation and tort liability may be conveniently grouped under five signifi-
-cant heads.
First and foremost is the statutory pattern itself (topic "I" below)
-i.e. what are the different periods that have been legislatively prescribed
beyond which certain tort actions cannot be brought. Since these vary from
.state to state, no safe generalizations can be made.
A second head (topic "II") concerns judicial attitudes toward classi-
fication of a cause of action. A jurisdiction may prescribe different periods
of limitation for different types of torts (e.g., five years for general tort
liability, but only two years for libel and slander). It is important to know
whether the judiciary is lenient or strict toward a plaintiff who character-
izes an *otherwise barred cause of action (e.g. libel) in such terms (e.g.
invasion of privacy) as to bring the case within the longer period of lim-
itation (5 years). 10
once in connection with wrongful death actions, and once with respect to their
classification in conflict of laws. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1295-98, 1686-88 (1956).
Although many articles have appeared dealing with particular aspects of the
statutes of limitation, the most recent attempt to deal with the entire subject in a
systematic and analytical fashion is now eighteen years old. Comment, 63 HARv.
L. RE.v. 1177 (1950).
5. Hopper v. Harper, 42 Mo. 137 (1868).
6. Kaufman v. C.R.A., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 721 .(W.D. Mo. 1965).
7. National Credit Associates, Inc. v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954 (K.C. Mo,
App. 1966); Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
8: McLendon v. Kissick, 363 Mo. 264, 250 S.W.2d 489 (1952).
9. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958), noted, 24 Mo. L. REv.
397 (1959), 35 N.D.L. Rnv. 171 (1959).
10. That the same acts can give rise to causes of action for both defamation
and invasion of privacy is well settled. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159
S.W.2d 291 (1942), noted 8 Mo. L. Rnv. 74, 304 (1943). In Missouri the defama-
tion action is subject to a two-year limitation, § 516.140, RSMo 1959. The action
for invasion of privacy, not having been "designated as subject to a special limita-
tion, is governed by the five-year limitation of § 516.120, RSMo 1959.
[Vol. 33
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1 TORT LIABTL1TY
A third head of inquiry (topic "III") concerns the so-called "running"
of the statute of limitation. It is important to know when the cause of
action arises and when the period of limitation begins.
A fourth head (topic "IV") concerns the types of circumstances
which can interrupt or suspend the running of the statute so that certain
periods of time cannot be included in the measurement for determining
whether the action" has been barred.
A fifth head of inquiry (topic "V") deals with legislative and judicial
pronouncements concerning wrongs that have a relationship with another
jurisdiction where a different period of limitation applies. If the other
jurisdiction's period is shorter than the forum's, it is important to know
whether the forum will apply -the shorter period even though the action
is not barred by the forum's statute of limitation. Conversely, if the statute
of limitation does not bar the cause of action in the other jurisdiction, it
is important to know whether a local court will permit the action to be
maintained even though the local statute would bar the cause. 1
Any consideration of the circumstances under which actions have
been barred by various statutes of limitation cannot avoid the question
whether the benefits to judicial administration are worth the occasional
injustices suffered by aggrieved persons who for good reasons may have
failed to begin their actions within the statutory period prescribed. This
question will be considered in the sixth and final head of inquiry (topic
'"I") which will also summarize the outstanding characteristics of the
statutes of limitation picture in Missouri.
I. THE STATUTORY STRUCTURE IN MISSOURI
Setting aside the limitations applicable to actions relevant to real
property' 2 and the relatively unimportant provisions covering actions on
penal statutes, 13 the statutory provisions in Missouri fall into three general
categories:
(1) general provisions establishing the periods within which certain
actions must be brought;
'11. The general rule is that the action is barred if the forum's statute bars
the action, regardless of what the statute of limitations is in the jurisdiction where
the action accrues. Farthing v. Sams, 296 Mo. 442, 446, 247 S.W. 111, 112 (1922).
See Vernon, Statutes of Limitations in Conflict of Laws, 32 Roc= MT. L. REV.
287, 298-300 (1960).12. §§ 516.010-.090, RSMo 1959. See Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme
Court for 1950-Property, 16 Mo._L. Rzv. 372, 383-86 (1951); and Note, 22 Mo.
L..REv. 227 (1957). "
13. §§ 516.380-.420, RSMo 1959.
1968] ,,I
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(2) special provisions applicable to special causes of action created
by the legislature and not known to the common law; and
(3) various limitations, provisos, savings clauses, and modifications
which apply to the general limitations provisions, and deal with
such matters as when the limitation period begins to run, when
it is suspended, etc.
A. The General Periods of Limitation Established by Chapter 516
Insofar as tort liability is concerned, the most important general
limitation provision is section 516.120. This establishes a five year period
within which the majority of negligence actions and the traditional actions
for trespass and for interference with personal property rights must be
initiated.' 4 Actions for fraud are made subject to a special tolling rule.
This suspends the running of the five year limitation until the aggrieved
party discovers the fraud, although if he fails to discover the fraud within
ten years his action is barred. 1 In effect, this exposes a defendant who is
guilty of fraud to fifteen years of civil jeopardy whereas the negligent driver
or despoiler of property is relieved after five years.
The second most important general limitation is section 516.140. It
establishes a limitation of only two years for the bringing of actions for
libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and criminal conversation.
Physicians, surgeons, dentists, nurses, roentgenologists, hospitals, and san-
itariums are also the beneficiaries of a two year limitations period with
respect to malpractice. For reasons which will appear later in the discussion,
such actions may be more strictly treated under this stature than actions
for libel, slander, assault, battery, etc.10
The final general provision is found in section 516.130. It covers
actions against sheriffs, coroners, or "other officers" for liabilities incurred
in their official capacities. The second paragraph applies to actions upon
a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to the party
aggrieved. All of these actions must be brought within three years. Cover-
14. Although the statute identifies by name certain types of actions which
are subject to the five year limitation (e.g., trespass and injuries to goods or chat-
tels) it does not use the terms "negligence," "tort," or "personal injury." § 516.120,
RSMo 1959.' Despite the absence of direct holdings that. this particular statutory
provision governs most tort actions, it is clear that it comprehends most tort ac-
tions not made subject to special limitations by other statutory provisions. See;
e.g., Williams v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 360 Mo. 501, 229 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
. 15.' § 516.120(5), RSMo 1959: See, e.g., Turnmire v. Claybrook, 204 S.W. 178
(M o. 1918). , I I . .
16. § 516.140, RSMo 1959. National Credit Associates, Inc. v. Tinker, 401
SW.2d 954 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966). 1
[Vol. 33
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ink, as i does, only a very small segment of the spectrum of torts de-
fendants, this-thiree year limitation has not proved particularly controversial,
-Its chief application has been to an action against a local officer on his
bond by a private citizen who has suffered legal wrong as a result of the
local officer's breach of duty'17 (e.g., action against a bonding company under
a notary's bond for losses resulting from the notary's forgery). It is also
used in the rare case where a private party is permitted to sue to recover a
penalty provided by statute (e.g., section 537.340, RSMo 1959 giving treble
damages to the owner where another person knowingly and wrongfully
enters the owner's land without his knowledge and consent and cuts and
carries away growing timber).18
The fundamental pattern of limitations for tort actions in Missouri
may be called the "two-three-five" system. The five year limitation is the
basic period for most negligence actions, the two year limitation applies
to some of the more important intentional torts and malpractice cases, and
a three year period applies to certain types of actions where the wrong
involves official misfeasance or is quasi-criminal in character.
The "two-three-five" system has a distinguished history. 'In Missouri
it traces back to at least the first Territorial Laws of 1807."9 Of course,
amendments have been made bringing certain types of torts within a cate.
gory or shifting some from one category to another.20 The basic notion
that different periods of limitation should apply, depending upon the
quality of the tort, apparently stems from the basic seventeenth century
statute of James I that established a "two-four-six" system.21 No one
has ever given an official explanation for the prescription of different periods
of limitation for different types of torts, although arguments in justification
17. § 516.130, RSMo 1959. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fichtner v. Haid, 324 Mo.
130, 22 S.W.2d 1045 (1929).
18. § 537.340, RSMo 1959. Robertson v. Welch, 246 S.W.2d 828 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1952).
19. Act of July 4, 1807, 1 Mo. TERR. LAws 144.
20. With respect to torts, the original limitations periods specified only those
initially comprehended by the forms of action (e.g., assault, battery, "actions on
the case for words," etc.), and, generally, established periods of two years or less.
Act of July 4, 1807, 1 Mo. Tmu. LAWS 144; § 510, RSMo 1825. A revision in
1849 added'new categories to the five year limitation previously applicable to ac-
tions sounding in contract. One of these categories ".... fifth, an action for criminal
conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising
on contract: . . ." ultimately became the general period of limitations applicable
to torts today. RSMo 1849, at 74.. Sommerfield v. St. Louis Transit Co., 84 S.W.
172 (St. L. Mo. App. 1904).
, 21. 21 .Jac. I., c.16 :(.1623). For a brief summary .of the history of the evol.,
tion of statutes of limitation see 17. R C.L. .663-64.(1917). .1" . 1
19681
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of the different. periods are not difficult to devise.22 No-officiil legislative
"findings" have typically accompanied the establishment of these periods. of
limitation. Therefore, the consequences they have upon legal relationships
and the anomalies they produce in a federal system must be a6cepted
upon a traditional rather than a logical basis.
Example 1: In Missouri, A negligently rides his bicycle into B
causing injuries to B. Four years later B sues A. B's action is n6t
barred.23
Example 2: Same facts as in Example "1" except that the
events take place in Kansas. B's action is barred. 24
Example 3: In Missouri, A intentionally runs his bicycle into
B causing injuries to B. Four years later B sues A. A's action is
barred.& 2 5
Example 4: Same facts as in Example "3" except that the
action is brought eighteen months later. In Missouri the action is
not barred, In Kansas the action is barred.
2 6
Example 5: Dr. X negligently fails to remove a banana peel
from his office hallway and a patient slips and falls on it. Four
years later the patient sues Dr. X. In Missouri the patient's suit
is probably not barred.27
Example 6: Dr. X negligently drops a banana peel into the
incision of a patient during surgery, and four years following the
completion of treatment the patient discovers the condition and
sues Dr. X. In Missouri the patient's suit is barred.
28
22. Some of the more astute speculations concerning the policy considerations
that may have led to the particular balances generally struck in modem statutes
of limitation may be found in Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitaton,
63 HARv. L. Rav. 1177, 1192-98 (1950).
23. § 516.120, RSMo 1959 establishes a five year limitations on actions for
negligence. See note 20 supra. Schiermeier v. Kroger Grocery & Bakery Co., 167
S.W.2d 967 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943) (reversed on other grounds); Gordon v. Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co., 24 S.W.2d 644 (K.C. Mo. App. 1929).
24. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1963) establishes a two year limitation
period for negligence actions.
25. § 516.140, RSMo 1959 establishes a two year limitations period for certain
types of actions, including battery.
26. KAN, GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514 (1963) establishes a one year limitation
for certain actions, including battery.
27. A physician is liable as an owner or occupier of land for hidden dangers,
traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like that in the exercise of ordinary care would
have been removed from his premises. This liability is in the nature of negligence;
and would be governed by the five year limitation. § 516.120, RSMo 1959.
28. Although no case has been uncovered wherein a surgeon has been charged
with leaving a banana peel in a patient's wound, surgeons have been charged with
abandoning a wide variety of objects in the incisions of patients. See, e.g.,
Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943)- (abandoned needle).
[Vol. 33
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Example 7: Same facts as in Example "6". except that the plain-'
tiff discovers the condition and sues eighteen months following the
completion of the operation and treatment. In neither Missouri
nor Kansas is the action barred. 29
B. Special or "Built i%" Limitation Periods Applicable to Statutory Actions
The legislature has from time to time created or recognized causes
of action other than those included in Chapter 516 of the revised statutes.
Among these are actions for wrongful death,30 actions for breach of con-
tract for sale (which include the anomalous "warranty" actions) 3 ' and
actions on constables' bonds 3 2 All of the foregoing have what are called
"built in" limitations. In other words the statute which creates the right
also establishes the period of time within which the action must be brought.
The general provisions of Chapter 516 therefore are inapplicable to these
causes of action.
In the case of the action for breach of contract for sale the period
is four years.3 3 Actions on constables' bonds are subject to a three year
limitation 3 4 Finally, the action for wrongful death is subject to a special
limitation of two years.35
Since a limitation period is typically significant only in terms of the
particular interval it establishes it may well be questioned whether the
source of the limitation (e.g., whether from the statute creating the right
Note, 9 Mo. L. REv. 102 (1944). See also Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384,
166 S.E. 285 (1932) (broken glass in vagina); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 9 (1966)
(collecting cases).
29. Although Kansas classifies malpractice as "negligence" for the purposes
of its statutes of limitations, the negligence statute in Kansas runs the same as
the "short" Missouri statute governing assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel,
slander, criminal conversation, and malpractice-two years. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-513 (1963); § 517.140, RSMo 1959; Hill v. Hays, 193 Kan. 45, 395 P.2d 298
(1964).
30. The limitation in actions for wrongful death was recently raised from
one year to two years. § 537.100, RSMo 1967 Supp.
31. § 400.2-725, RSMo 1967 Supp. For an example of the types of incon-
sistencies which can result when the nonconforming UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
limitations period is introduced into an existing system see Abate v. Barkers of
Wallingford, Inc., 27 Conn. Supp. 46, 229 A.2d 366 (1967) (retailer liable under
the code because of the four-year statute, but attempt to implead the manufacturer
fails because the negligence statute is one year.)
32. § 63.100, RSMo 1959. Another provision establishes liability on constables'
bonds for the City of St. Louis. Since this statute contains no special limitation it
is subject to the general provisions of Chapter 516. State v. Weathers, 396 S.W.2d
746 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
33. See note 31 sunpra.
34. See note 32 supra.
35. See note 30 supra.
1968]
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or whether from Chapter 516 which sets forth general limitations) is of
any'real importance. The courts have ruled, however, that the source is
important. Limitation periods which are "built in" the statutes creating
such rights are much more harshly applied than the general periods of
limitation. These harsh applications -result from two quite independent
theories. In the first place it has been held, and is widely accepted, that
where a limitation period is established by the very statute creating the
right (or, sometimes, where it is independently established, but specifically
directed to the legislatively created right) it becomes part of the substan-
tive right itself.30 As an integral part of the cause of action it is "substantive"
and not "procedural." Therefore, the limitation period cannot be suspended
or disregarded under conditions or circumstances which justify suspension
or disregard of "procedural" statutes of limitation. Thus, where the limita-
tion is "built in," it is unnecessary to plead the statute as an affirmative
defense,37 and a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action may be granted subsequent to the pleading stage and, argua-
bly, at any stage of the proceedings.38 In the second place, it is a conflicts
principle recognized in Missouri, although unsettled in other jurisdictions,
that a shorter period of limitation applicable in the state of the forum, is not
applicable where a longer limitation has been "built in" the statute by
the jurisdiction which created the cause of action, and wherein the cause
of, action arose.3 9
Example 8: A brings an action against B for false imprison-
ment. B's answer denies the facts of A's petition but does not allege,
as an affirmative defense, that the facts giving rise to A's action
occurred three years previously. Although B may be permitted to
amend his answer in order to assert the statute of limitations as
an affirmative defense, without the amendment the statute is not a
bar.40
36. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
37. Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947).
38. Devault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193, 194 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946) (dictum);
Baysinger v. Hanser, supra note 37.
39. Theroux v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 64 Fed. 84 (8th Cir. 1894). How-
ever, the rule that the shorter forum statute will not bar the claim where it
accrues in a jurisdiction which has a "built in" limitation of greater duration is
not universally accepted. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Reporter's
Note § 143 at 497 (Proposed Official Draft 1967); LEFLAR, CONFLICr OF LAWS 122
(1959). For a suggestion to the effect that the foregoing rule is on the wane,
see GOODRICH & ScoLEs, CONFLICT OF LAWS 155 (4th ed. 1964).
40. See Smith v. Lewis County Abstract and Investment Co., 415 S.W. 2d
33 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967) (dismissal of action error where defendant did not as-
sert the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense; but only moved to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be -granted.)
[Vol. 33
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Example 9: Facts are the same as in example "8," except
that A is a widow bringing an action for the wrongful death of her
husband. The statute of limitations may be asserted at any stage
of the proceeding since it is a part of the substantive right, and it
is unnecessary for the defendant to assert it as an affirmative
defense.41
(Caveat: It is not clear whether a petition stating a cause of action
subject to the general limitations of Chapter 516 which asserts facts in-
dicating that the action is barred by one or more of the provisions of
Chapter 516 is nevertheless sufficient in the absence of an affirmative de-
fense that the statute has run.) 42
Example 10: Action is brought in Missouri for wrongful death
occurring in State X, which has a five year statute of limitation.
The action is brought three years after the occurrence of the acci-
dent. Missouri has a two year limitation on the action for wrong-
ful death. Normally Missouri would apply its own limitation.
However, if State X, like Missouri, has a special "built in" limitation
on the action for, wrongful death, the limitation would be consid-
ered part of the substantive right itself, and the action could there-
fore be maintained in Missouri.43
Although traditional conflict of laws principles are being reappraised
in many jurisdictions, and considerable uncertainty presently exists con-
cerning the rule applicable in a given situation,44 a sister state is far more
likely to apply the stricter Missouri limitation, where the limitation is
41. See Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); Baysinger v. Hanser,
355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947); Vance v. Maytag Sales Corp., 159 Va. 373,
165 S.E. 393 (1932); Lawrence v. Melvin, 202 Iowa 866, 211 N.W. 410 (1926).
Surprisingly few cases have considered the effect of a delayed assertion of the
statute of limitations where the statute is part of the substantive right sued upon.
Utah requires the plea at the first opportunity. Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 78 Utah 447, 4 P.2d 1083 (1931).
42. A number of cases hold that where the expiration of a limitation period
appears on the face of the petition, the action is subject to a motion to dismiss
and the defense of the statute of limitations need not be affirmatively pleaded
in the answer. E.g. Hall v. Smith, 355 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1962). However, objec-
tions may be made as to the clarity with which the disability appears in the
petition, and if sustained, the failure to raise the statutory bar by way of
affirmative defense may result in the loss of the defense. E.g. Maddox v. Duncan,
62 Mo. App. 474 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895). See 12 WHEATON & BLACKMAR, MISSOURI
PRACTiCE 731-38 (1965).
43. Martinez v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 296 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1956); Lang v.
J. C. Nichols Inv. Co., 227 Mo. App. 1123, 59 S.W.2d 63 (K.C. Ct. App. 1933);
Newell v. Harrison Eng. & Const. Corp., 149 Kan. 838, 89 P.2d 869 (1939).
44. See CAvERs, THE CHiOIcE-oF-LAw PROCESS (1965); Ehrenzweig, A Counter-
Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 377 (1966).
19681
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"built in" the substantive cause of action, 'than its own more liberal
period where applicable to the cause of action.4"
Example 11: State X has a. three year limitation period- on
actions for wrongful death. Yet where -the cause of action arises in
Missouri, State X will very likely hold the action barred by
the two year limitation presently applicable in Missouri because
that limitation is "built in" the action. It has been construed by*
Missouri courts to be a part of the substantive right itself. In the
absence of a "borrowing statute".(a statute which-makes the shorter
foreign limitation applicable regardless of whether it is classified
as substantive or procedural) this result would not follow if the
action were for negligence and the action, though barred in Missouri,
would not be .barred under the statutes of limitation applicable in
State 'X.
The most critical differentiation made by the courts between causes
of action with "built in" limitation periods and causes of action subject
to the general provisions of Chapter 516 has to do with the various "tolling"
provisions contained in Chapter 516. Most of these "tolling" provisions
are judicially established "exceptions" to general statutes of limitation
which were incorporated into the law by the legislature in Chapter 516.47
Briefly stated, the rule is that these "exceptions," or "tolling" provisions,
do xot apply to causes of action with "built in" statutes of limitation un-
less the legislature specifically so provides." Thus, the automatic one year
extension in the event of a nonsuit49 (Although nowhere employed by the
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, the term "nonsuit" is employed by the
45. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICr OF LAWS, Reporter's Note § 143 at
496 (Proposed Official Draft 1967); Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d
321 (Mo. 1966); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1964).
46. Wheeler v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 207 Ark. 601, 182 S.W.2d
214 (1944).
47. Sections 516.170, .180, .230, .240, .250, .260, .280, RSMo 1959. For analytic
discussion of these statutory provisions see text accompanying notes 128 et seq.,
infra. Courts have uniformly refused to create exemptions or suspensions by de-
cisional law where the case is not within one of the categories created by the
legislature. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 361 Mo. 799, 237 S.W.2d 100 (1951);
Wormington v. City of Monett, 358 Mo. 1044, 218 S.W.2d 586 (En Banc 1949).
48. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); State ex rel Bier v. Big-
ger, 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. En Bane 1944), noted, 10 Mo. L. REV.
302 (1945); Kohout v. Adler, 327 S.W.2d 492 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959), noted,
26 Mo. L. REv. 80 (1961). Louisiana is apparently the only jurisdiction which
makes its tolling provisions applicable to all limitations, whether specific or
general. Mitchell v. Sklar, 196 So. 392 (La. App. 1940).
49. § 516.230, RSMo 1959. State ex rel. Moore v. Weathers, 396 S.W.2d 746
(St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Kohout v. Adler, .rupra note 48.
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savings. pkovisions of: the statutes.of limitation in Chapter 516, and in the
provision applicable to actions for wrongful death. In both places; and, when
referred to -in this study, it refers -to any termination of an action which
does -not .adjudicate issues on the merits);, the provision which suspends the
running of the limitation period during a period of disability;50 the "out
of state" suspension provision;.. and.the provision tolling the statute during
such time as the defendant, by his "improper act," prevents the plaintiff
from. suing;52 -do not apply to causes of action independently created with
their own "built in" limitations.
Exacmple 12: Defendant negligently operates his car and there-'
by causes'thee death of plaintiff's wife and plaintiff's minor child.
Four other minor children of the plaintiff survive. Defendant fails
to 'report the. accident. Despite a persistently pressed search to de-
termine the defendant's identity, plaintiff does not finally discover
who he .is until three years after the accident, which is one year
more than the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff's actions
on behalf of himself and on behalf of the four surviving minor
children for wrongful death are barred. If plaintiff has suffered per-
sonal injuries in the collision, however, hir action is not barred. 3
Since it is clear that different results" follow, depending upon whether
lie limitation period is "built in" the statutory remedy or whether it is
one of the general provisions of Chapter 516, the various "built in" statutes
inust be recognized as an iridependent constituent of the statutory structure
C. Savings and Tolling Provisions
The rule holding the various tolling and savings provisions of Chapter
516 inapplicable to statutes of limitation "built in" to particular statutory
remedies demonstrates that these tolling and savings provisions are them-
selves important parts of the general statutory structure.
These savings and tolling provisions themselves fall into five general
categories. They are discussed in detail, infra. The categories follow:
(1) provisions tolling the limitation period during a status disabil-
50. § 516.170, RSMo 1959. Hellerbrand v. Hoctor, 331 F.2d 453 (8th Cir.
1964) (dictum).
51. § 516.200, RSMo 1959. Cobb v. Houston, 117 Mo. App. 645, 94 S.W. 299
(St. L. Ct. App. 1906). But see Airy v. Swinford, 154 Mo. App. 584, 136 S.W.
728 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
,' 52. § 516.280, RSMo (1959); Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
53. § 516280, RSMo (1959); Frazee v, Partney, s pra note 52.
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ity attributable to a state of war or to the defendant's being
outside of the state;54
(2) provisions tolling the limitation period because of a personal
disability under which the plaintiff labors (E.g., minority, im-
prisonment, or insanity);55
(3) provisions extending the period for an additional year because
of a related judicial proceeding such as the "suffering" of a
nonsuit or arrest of judgment or verdict, or tolling the statute
during such period where the commencement of the action
has been stayed by injunction;58
(4) provisions tolling the limitation period during such time as the
plaintiff is prevented from beginning the action by the defend-
ant's improper act;57
(5) provisions applicable when death occurs and which extend
the limitation period when a cause of action survives. This in-
sures that the person entitled to bring the survival action is not
unduly prejudiced by the uncertainties which necessarily exist
during the transition period following either the death of the
plaintiff or the defendantP8
Although strictly speaking not a "savings" or "tolling" provision, the
statutory provision which suspends the running of a limitations period
until such time as all elements of damage are sustained and ascertainable
is also a part of the general statutory structure. It has been construed
not to apply where the legislature has arguably established other criteria
for determining the inception of the limitation period."
54. § 516.200, RSMo 1959. See, e.g., Koppel v. Rowland, 319 Mo. 602,
4 S.W.2d 816 (1928)-.
55. § 516.170, RSMo 1959. See, e.g., Devault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193, 194
S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946).
56. § 516.230, RSMo 1959 ("suffer" a nonsuit). See, e.g., State v. Litzinger,
417 S.W.2d 126 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967). § 516.260, RSMo 1959 (injunction). See,
e.g., Cordia v. Matthes, 338 Mo. 308, 90 S.W.2d 101 (1936), noted on collateral
point, 5 Mo. L. REV. 523 (1940).
57. § 516.280, RSMo 1959. See, e.g., Arnold v. Scott, 2 Mo. 15 (1828). The
statute has not been helpful to plaintiffs who have sought its protection. See, e.g.,
Hellerbrand v. Hoctor, 331 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1964).
58. §§ 516.240-.250, RSMo 1959. See e.g., Longan v. Kansas City Rys. Co.,
299 Mo. 561, 253 S.W. 578 (1923); Thompson v. Lyons, 281 Mo. 430, 220 S.W.
942 (1920). The foregoing statutory provisions apply where one of the parties dies
after an action has been begun. Where suit has not yet been brought the normal
statute of limitations apparently continues to run. § 537.020, RSMo 1959.
59. § 537.100, RSMo 1959. Rippe v. Sutter, 292 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1956), note,
22 Mo. L. REv. 343 (1957). The inapplicability of this provision to situations where
the legislature has established special periods of limitation is suggested in National
Credit Associates, Inc. v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954, 959 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966),
but rejected by the late Dean McCleary. Note, 9 Mo. L. REv. 102, 106 (1944).
[Vol. 33
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Having surveyed the statutory structure itself, attention must be given
to the ways in which these statutes have been construed.
II. JUDICIAL RECLASSIFICATION OF THE NATURE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN
ORDER TO AVOID A STATUTE OF LIMITATION
As the foregoing discussion suggests, under differing circumstances the
defendant may be prevented from asserting the defense of the statute of
limitation. Although the tolling provision typically is statutory, most of
these circumstances involve what may be characterized as "equitable" con-
siderations. Thus fraud on the part of the defendant 60 waiver, or a course
of conduct short of fraud that has moved the plaintiff not to press his
claim (estoppel)"' are grounds for denying the defendant the benefit of
the statute. Similarly, the "status" disabilities of the plaintiff may result
in the loss of the statute of limitation defense. Thus, infancy, incapacity,
or official incarceration of the plaintiff may suspend the running of the
statute of limitation until the disability abates.0 2 Most of these various
conditions formerly appealed to "equitable" principles to overcome the de-
fense of the statute. Today they are enbodied in the general statutory struc-
ture of Missouri and other states. For this reason the types of conduct and
the disabilities which toll the running of the statute are discussed in the
"tolling" and "accrual" section infra.
At this point a subtler means of avoiding the defense of the statute of
limitation-namely, reclassification will be analysed.
Because the various statutes of limitation set up different periods of
limitation for different types of legal wrongs reclassification is a means of
overcoming a defense based upon a statute of limitation. Plaintiffs' attor-
neys frequently must frame their pleadings so as to allege a wrong not
normally associated with defendants' alleged conduct in order to escape
from an otherwise applicable statute of limitation.
Dean McCleary's interpretation is consistent with that given by the federal court
of appeals for the Ninth Circuit which referred to the Missouri view in connection
with a case controlled by Idaho law. Summers v. Wallace Hospital, 276 F.2d 831
(9th Cir. 1960).
60. The classic articles are Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of
Limitation, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 87 (1933), and Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of
Limitation, 34 MIcH L. REv. 1 (1935). See also Dezelopments in the Law-
Statutes of Limitation, 63 HAvv. L. REV. 1177, 1220-24 (1950).
61. See, e.g., Hickam v. Hickam, 46 Mo. App. 496 (K.C. Mo. App. 1891)
(failure to advise negro servant of the Emancipation Proclamation). The differing
views with respect to the breadth-of the fraud and estoppel postponements are
summarized in Note, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 441 (1966).
62. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, supra note 62, at 1229-
1968]
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A recurring example of the advantages of the reclassification technique
is the reclassifying of what would normally be an action for malpractice
as an action for breach of contract. 3 In Missouri and many other states,
-the statute of limitation for malpractice is two years," whereas actions
for most breaches of simple contract are barred after five years. 65 Obviously,
if an action normally described as being one for "malpractice" can be
reclassified as one for "breach of a contract to provide professional medical
services," the plaintiff can overcome the two year barrier and bring his
action within the more generous five year period. Thus, in Illinois, a
wife's action against a physician for damages (her pregnancy) resulting
from an allegedly faulty vasectomy performed upon her husband was held
governed by the five year period of limitation applicable to contractual
claims, and was therefore not barred by the shorter period applicable to
malpractice actions. 68
In Missouri, most attempts to bypass the two year period of limita-
tions applicable to malpractice actions have failed. In Barnhoff v. Aldridge67
the Supreme Court held that the action for malpractice had been distin-
guished from other negligence actions by the legislature. It was made sub-
ject to a shorter period of limitation than other negligence actions. Therefore
actions against any of the defendants mentioned in the statute and founded
upon an alleged defect in professional skill could not legitimately be clas-
sified as anything other than malpractice. The Supreme Court noted, how-
ever, that where the action for malpractice had not been singled out for
special treatment, a majority of jurisdictions would apply the statute of
limitations governing whichever theory the plaintiff invoked-whether tort
or contract.6 8 Similarly, an attempt to escape from the short two-year lim-
itation period by characterizing the claim as an action for "fraud" (five
years) has been barred by the Kansas City Court of Appeals., 9
63. See, e.g., Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966);
Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 772, 38 S.W.2d 1029, 1031 (1931) (acknowledg-
ing the reclassification technique but not applying it in Missouri). See also Lillich,
The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 339, 347-52, 361-63 (1962).
64. § 516.140, RSMo 1959. Over half of United States jurisdictions apply a
two year statute. Lillich, supra note 63, at 357.
65. § 516.120, RSMo 1959. In most jurisdictions the contract statute of
limitations is longer than the statute otherwise applicable to malpractice actions.
Lillich, supra note 63, at 361.
66. Doerr v. Villate, 74 IIl. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
67. 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
68. Id. at 772, 38 S.W.2d at 1031.
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An attempt to reclassify a wrongful death action (at the time of the
action subject to a one-year statute of limitation) as one for malpractice,
and therefore within the two-year period was also denied3 0
On the other hand, nurses, unless they have been specifically designated
as subject to its protection by the legislature, have been uniformly denied
the protection of the shorter malpractice limitations period applicable to
doctors. 71 That rule does not apply in this state because Missouri extends
the shorter limitations period to "physicians, surgeons, dentists, roentgenol-
ogists, -nurses, hospitals and sanitariums. '72
While the Missouri Supreme Court has explained its reluctance to
reclassify a malpractice action by referring to the terms of the malpractice
statute, the reluctance could be viewed as representing a general policy
against reclassification for this purpose. Thus, in Chemical Workers Basic
Union v. Arnold Say. Bank73 where the action was based upon payment
of a forged check, the court refused to reclassify a conversion action (barred
by the five-year statute) as an action upon a writing (subject to a ten-year
period). Reclassification was also denied where the basic theory was neg-
ligence in the communication of false and misleading information concern-
ing oil properties. 4 Since the five year period applicable to negligence actions
had expired, the plaintiff sought to have the action characterized as one
for fraud so as to take advantage of the more liberal treatment extended
to fraud actions, but the theory was rejected.
With the adoption of the Uniform Comimercial Code, Missouri has, in
effect, adopted a four-year period of limitation applicable to causes of
action against a retailer for damages (including personal injuries) for
breaches of warranty.75 In many cases, the injured party may have alter-
native theories of relief against the manufacturer (negigence,76 breach of
warranty,77 or absolute liability,78) or, perhaps, even against the retailerY9
70. Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947).
71. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1336 (1966) (cases collected).
72. § 516.140, RSMo 1959.
73. 411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
74. Kaufman v. C.R.A., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
75. Statute and case cited note 31 supra.
76. See, e.g., Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d
87 (1949), noted, 16 Mo. L. Rxv. 76 (1951), 15 Mo. L. REv. 418 (1950).
77. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Morrow v.
Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963), Note, 29 Mo. L. REv. 217
(1964).
78. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d 443 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
It is true that the end result is the same whether one goes on a warranty without
privity theory, or on the theory advanced by RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS
1968]
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The characterization of the products liability action as being under the
Code or as being independent of the Code will affect the statute of limitation
applicable to the action (four years under the Code; but five years if based
upon another theory).
Only two significant departures from the general policy against re-
classification have been noted in Missouri. Under the Missouri "borrowing
statute" a cause of action barred by an appropriate statute of limitation
in another jurisdiction is barred in Missouri. 0 However, with respect to
a claim against a decedent's estate barred in Iowa, the Missouri Supreme
Court allowed the claim to be presented in an ancillary administration in
Missouri on the theory that since the claim was barred in Iowa under a
"nonclaim statute" it was not "a cause of action ... fully barred by the laws
of the state ... in which it originated . . .,,s
A second instance in which the general policy against reclassification
was arguably not applied is Williams z. Illinois Central R. Co. 82 The plain-
tiff was injured in a train wreck in Louisiana. Her action was barred by
the Louisiana one year statute of limitations. However she had originally
purchased her round-trip ticket in St. Louis, and the Missouri Supreme
Court held that her action could be brought on an ex contractu theory,
which would not be barred by the longer Missouri period of limitations
applicable to such actions. Barnhoff v. Aldridge,83 the leading authority
opposed to reclassification, was distinguished on the ground that the peti-
tion in* the Barnlhoff case sounded both in tort and contract, whereas the
only theory advanced by the complaint in Williams was a contract theory.84
§ 402A (1965) (absolute liability). It is not clear whether the zones of prospective
plaintiffs (sometimes described as those to whom defendant owed a "duty")
are congruent, and whether each theory embraces identical types of injuries.
79. See, e.g., Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d
603 (1945) (breach of sale warranty); McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic
Goods Co., 144 S.W.2d 866 (K.C. Mo. App. 1940) (negligence). §§ 400.2-313,
.2-314, and .2-715(b), RSMo 1967 Supp. (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE) codify the
action which a person in statutory privity with the merchant may have for injuries
resulting from breach of warranty of a sale contract. See Lauer, Sales Warranties
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REv. 259 (1965). For a com-
prehensive and trenchant analysis of the evolution of warranty law in Missouri see
Overstreet, Some Aspects of Implied Warranties in the Supreme Court of Missouri,
10 Mo. L. REv. 147 (1945).
80. § 516.190, RSMo 1959. Girth v. Beaty Grocery Co., 407 S.W.2d 881 (Mo.
1966); Jenkins v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1952).
81. § 516.190, RSMo 1959. Owens v. Saville's Estate, 409 S.W.2d 660 (Mo.
1966).
82. 360 Mo. 501, 229 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
83. 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
84. Williams v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 360 Mo. 501, 508, 229 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1950).
[Vol. 3
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In summary, although exceptions undoubtedly exist, Missouri courts
are not disposed to approve reclassification of a cause of action in order
to avoid an otherwise applicable statute of limitation. In this respect
Missouri takes a far more conservative position than such states as Il-
linois,8 - and Florida,8 6 which freely reclassify in terms of the form of injury
of which plaintiff complains. Florida provides an interesting variant because,
unlike most jurisdictions, the statute of limitation applicable to contracts
(three years) is shorter than that applicable to torts (four years) 8 7 In
Florida, therefore, the reclassification pressure is from contract to tort,
rather than the reverse, as exemplified by our own case of Barnhoff v.
Aldridge.s8
III. ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
Before it can be decided whether a given action is barred by the
appropriate statute of limitation, it must be determined at what time the
statute began to "run." Statutes and judicial decisions have tended to
identify one of four events as "triggering" the running of the statute: the
moment the defendant commits his wrong (the "wrongful act" test);8 9
the moment the plaintiff sustains substantial injury or interference (the
"sustainment of injury" test);9O the moment that plaintiff's damages are
substantially complete (the "capable of ascertainment" test);91 or the
85. Doerr v. Villate, 74 IIl. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
86. Manning v. Serrano, 97 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1957).
87. F.S.A. § 95.11(4), (5)(e) (1960).
88. 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931). See Annot. 80 A.L.R.2d 320 (1961)
(collecting cases).
89. See, e.g., Barnard v. Boulware, 5 Mo. 454 (1838). Where retained, the
"wrongful act" test has been typically limited to the intentional torts. See, e.g.,
Fraser v, Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 66 Ga. App. 630, 19 S.E.2d 38 (1942). The
unfair feature of the "wrongful act" test is that deserving plaintiffs are foreclosed
when unaware of their injuries until after the limitations periods have expired.
This is similar to those features which attend the notion that "present warranties"
are broken when made so that the establishment of a superior title at a point in
time outside the limitations period on the warranty leaves the warranty beneficiary
with no redress. E.g., McGraw v. Elkins, 36 S.W.2d 424 (Spr. Mo. App. 1931);
Frank v. Organ, 167 Mo. App. 493, 151 S.W. 504 (Spr. Ct. App. 1912).
90. See, e.g., Kohout v. Adler, 327 S.W.2d 492 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). Contra
State ex rel. Barringer v. Hawkins, 103 Mo. App. 251, 77 S.W. 98 (K.C. Ct. App.
1903). Note, 26 Mo. L. RFy. 80 (1961).
91. See, e.g., § 516.100, RSMo 1959. The Missouri statute has received favor-
able comment in other jurisdictions. Developments in the Law-Statutes of
imitation, 63 HA.v. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (1950); Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261,
263 (Del. 1967); Summers v. Wallace Hospital, 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960).
This favorable comment is undeserved because Missouri courts have not given the
statute a literal application. See, e.g., Chemical Workers Union v. Arnold Say.
Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Mo. En Banc .1966); Saigh v. Busch, 403 S.W.2d
!968]
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moment the plaintiff first becomes aware that he has been aggrieved (the
so-called "discovery" test).92
The policy established by the Missouri statute adopts the third test.
The running of the statute is measured from the time that the damages
are complete and capable of ascertainment.93 On its face, this policy ap-
pears to be an acceptable compromise between the plaintiff-favoring "dis-
covery" test and the defendant-favoring "wrongful act" test. Yet in ap-
plication it has spawned decisions of questionable justice.
As a pure matter of interpretation, normal canons of construction
would not be offended if the phrase "capable of ascertainment" were
construed to mean "capable of ascertainment in the normal course of
events by this particular plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable diligence."
Thus interpreted, the "complete and capable of ascertainment" test would
be almost the equivalent of the "discovery" test, excluding from its pro-
tection only those who have been "negligent" in-failing to make themselves
aware of the injury to their interests for which the defendant was initially
responsible. In an early case the St. Louis Court of Appeals rejected this
more liberal possibility. It adopted an objective theory that has the effect
of foreclosing from recovery all tort victims who, for whatever reason,
do not become aware of the nature and extent of their injuries until after
.the statute of limitations has run."
In the normal tort action no limitation problem of the type described
above arises because act, injury, and discovery, are simultaneous events.
The punch in the nose and the injury-producing automobile collision are
obvious examples. However, where the injury is more subtle (e.g., a forged
deed of trust,95 or a conspiracy to deprive a person of property by pro-
curing false or void judgments);9' endured over a considerable interval of
time (e.g., false imprisonment or continuous acts of medical malpractice);97
or, although technically discoverable is not readily apparent (e.g., leaving
559 (Mo. 1966) (barring of preemptive rights began with irregular charter amend-
ment and not with the exercise of the power conferred); Gruenewaelder v. Winter-
mann, 360 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1962); Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d
994 (1945); Note, 12 Mo. L. REv. 86 (1947).
92. See, e.g., Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261 (Del. 1967); Gaddis v. Smith,
417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
93. See note 91 spra.
94. Allison v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933),
Note, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 336 (case incorrectly identified as a Missouri Supreme
Court decision).
95. Kohout v. Adler, 327 S.W.2d 492 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
96. Rippe v. Sutter, 292 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1956).
97. Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d 994 (1945).
[Vol." 33
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a needle or sponge in a surgical incision), 8 it is clear that the "capable of
ascertainment" test substantially limits the defendant's tort liability. This
is so because in many cases damage may be technically complete long
before the plaintiff becomes aware of it. Thus by the time he is moved
to sue, the statute of limitation may have run.P9
The most notorious examples of the types of injustice produced by the
"capable of ascertainment" test are provided by malpractice actions. If,
following treatment, the abandoned sponge or damaged tissue is objectively
capable of being ascertained, the statute begins to run. It does not matter
that the plaintiff is actually unaware of the injury, or, at least, unaware
of the full extent of the injury.10 0 The rule has been softened somewhat
by holdings that the damage is not capable of being ascertained until the en-
tire "treatment" of the particular condition for which medical services were
sought has been completed. 1 1 Yet it is only in the unusual case that the
exception would withhold the running of the statute for any substantial
period. Moreover, Missouri's malpractice statute of limitation specifically
states that the action "... shall be brought within two years from the date
of the act of neglect complained of . .. "102 It has been suggested that
the general statutory provision which provides that a cause of action does
not accrue until the damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment 03
does not apply. This is because the malpractice statute undertakes to make
an independent designation of the point of time at which the statute
begins to run (". . . date of the act of neglect complained of ....,,)10
That the "end of treatment" exception to the harsh two year rule in
malpractice cases is not wholly without some practical advantage is il-
lustrated by the leading case of Thatcher v. De Tar.10 5 In this action,
plaintiff discovered an abandoned needle in a surgical wound more than
98. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Ingram v.
Poston, 260 S.W. 773 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924).
99. See, e.g., National Credit Associates v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1966) (patient alleged malpractice undiscovered until after limitations period
had expired.)
100. E.g. Allison v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771 (St. L. Mo. App.
1933).
101. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
102. § 516.140, RSMo 1959.
103. § 516.100, RSMo 1959.
104. National Credit Associates, Inc. v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954, 959 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1966); Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d 994 (1945). The
notion that the general "capable of ascertainment" test does not apply to malprac-
tice actions was repudiated by the late Dean McCleary and rejected by the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See note 59 supra.
105. 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Note 9 Mo. L. REv. 102 (1944).
1968]
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
two years following the surgery, but less than two years following the
termination of the defendant's treatment of the condition for which the
surgery had been found necessary. The Missouri Supreme Court held that
the action was not barred. It cited cases holding that for the "'end' of
treatment" exception to be applicable the continuing treatment must be
proximately related to the illness, condition, acts, or medication which al-
legedly gave rise to the cause of action for malpractice. 10 6 In other words
suppose a doctor makes a faulty cast which produces an impairment of the
leg discovered more than two years after the treatment of the leg has been
completed. Although plaintiff continued under the defendant's care in con-
nection with a diabetic condition, the statute began to run the moment
the treatment of the leg had been completed. Of course it would be other-:
wise if the doctor had continued to treat the leg, or had been administer-
ing, prescribing, or supervising physical therapy for the leg.
On its face, the most inviting escape from the strict Missouri rules
relative to the accrual of a cause of action is that applicable to fraud. The
statutory provision is as follows:
An action for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of
action in such cases to be deemed not to have accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten years,
of the facts constituting the fraud.'07
Other jurisdictions have permitted plaintiffs, who.belatedly discover
that their aches and pains are the results of medical negligence, to sue
the offending physician, despite the expiration of the otherwise applicable
statute of limitations, on a theory of fraudulent concealment. 08 Even
where the doctor was himself unaware of his negligence, so that fraudulent
concealment could not be shown, some courts have been moved to adopt
a rule of "constructive" fraudulent concealment. 0 9 If, in Missouri, the
courts could be persuaded to characterize malpractice and other types of
actions as actions for "fraud," a considerable opportunity to overcome
otherwise applicable statutes of limitation would be available. The Missouri
Supreme Court has, however, rebuffed such attempts when the action is
106. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 608, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1943).
107. § 516.120 (5), RSMo 1959.
108. See, e.g., Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957); 3 S.D.L.
REv. 187 (1958); PROSSER, TORTS 147 (3d ed. 1964).
109. See, e.g. Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261 266 (Del. 1967); 18 W. RS. L.
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for malpractice. It has held the "fraud" extensions inapplicable to causes
of action arising under special statutes.1 0 The Court has also held that
the more liberal provisions (permitting a theoretical limitation period of
almost fifteen years to run if the plaintiff discovers the defendant's fraud for
the first time on the last day of the tenth year following its commission)
apply only to "concealed" fraud. Where the fraud is reasonably subject to
discovery through the exercise of ordinary diligence, the statute begins to
run from the moment it is so discoverable, rather than from the time the
plaintiff actually discovers it."'
It is clear, therefore, that objective rather than subjective criteria
have been utilized by the Missouri courts in their interpretations of these
statutes of limitation. Thus, the rule appears to be that the statute of
limitation will begin to run, under section 516.100, when the damage is
capable of ascertainment in an objective sense, and not when, in view of this
particular plaintiffs proclivities and characteristics, it was in fact ascer-
tained.112 Similarly, even though the statute says that the action for fraud
may be commenced any time within five years following ". . . discovery
by the aggrieved party . . . ,"-11 the courts have in effect construed this
phrase to say ". . . discovery by a person in the exercise of due dil-
igence . ... 114
It will be recalled that two intermediate positions for determining
the time when a cause of action accrues were noted between the defend-
ant-favoring "wrongful act" test and the plaintiff-favoring "discovery" test.
One of these positions puts the statute in motion as soon as the plaintiff
actually sustains a substantial injury, whether or not complete and whether
or not capable of ascertainment. The other position is more liberal. It
puts the statute in motion only when the damages are substantially
110. National Credit Associates, Inc. v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1966); State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. En
Banc 1944); 10 Mo. L. Rzv. 302 (1945).
111. Gruenewaelder v. Wintermann, 360 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1962); Scott v.
Boswell, 136 Mo. App. 601, 118 S.W. 521 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).
112. Chemical Workers Basic Union v. Arnold Say. Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159,
164 (Mo. En Banc 1966); Rippe v. Sutter, 292 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. 1956);
Allison v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771, 773 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933);
Dennig v. Meckfessel, 303 Mo. 525, 261 S.W. 55 (1924).
113. § 516.120 (5), RSMo 1959.
114. Cases cited note 111 supra. The "due diligence" qualification to the ex-
plicit terms of § 516.120 (5), RSMo 1959 is entirely a result of decisional law.
The leading case- is Brown v. Irving-Pitt Mfg. Co., 316 Mo. 1023, 292 S.W.
1023 (1927). The notion was first transferred into the torts arena as a qualification
to the "capable of ascertainment" test of § 516.100, RSMo 1959 by Allison v. Mo.
Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 77 (St. L. Mo. App, 1933).
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complete and objectively apprehensible by the aggrieved party. The signifi-
cance of this is illustrated by the case of Rippe v. Sutter.15 Here plaintiff
sued for damages allegedly resulting from a conspiracy to maintain spurious
actions against her and to obtain false and void judgments. The court
held, for purposes of determining when the statute of limitation began to
run, that the last act charged resulting in damage to the plaintiff was the
critical point. Since the last act charged was the obtaining of the allegedly
false judgments, the date of their entry would be the starting point (and
conceivably within the period of limitations), rather than alleged earlier
activities which were without the statutory period.""
Missouri has adopted the most liberal of the two intermediate tests
for identifying the starting point of the statute of limitation (the "capable
of ascertainment" test). Yet many situations can arise where a plaintiff
may understandably delay bringing an action only to find that his action
is barred because his damages were "perfected" or "complete" and "capable
of ascertainment" at a point in time which is now outside the limitations
period. No better illustration of this can be found than the leading Missouri
decision, Allison v. Mo. Power & Ligkt Co.1 7 In 1926 the plaintiff was
injured in the course of his employment when struck in the face by a steel
bar. His employer immediately took him to a doctor whose examination
revealed no permanent injuries. The employee returned to work and
suffered no loss of earning power until something more than three years
later. Then he reported much pain, indigestion, and other discomfort
allegedly resulting from constrictions in the air passages around his nose.
Again, the employer had him examined and paid for the subsequent sur-
gery which the condition required. Unfortunately, the surgery did not
cure the condition and the employee was unable to return to work. In
April of 1932, more than six years after the injury had been sustained,
suit was filed. The St. Louis Court of Appeals sustained a demurrer based
upon the statute of limitations. The tough question facing the court in
the Allison case was when the damage was "sustained and . . . capable of
ascertainment." The court had to choose between the "defendant-favoring"
moment, which was the time at which the actual physical alterations of
the body tissues and bone took place, or the "plaintiff-favoring" moment,
which was the time when the full physiological consequences of these alter-
115. 292 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1956); 22 Mo. L. REv. 343 (1957).
116. Rippe v. Sutter, 292 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1956). In the Rippe case the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the "due diligence" qualification to the "capable of
ascertainment" test. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
117. 59 S.W.2d 771 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933); 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 336.
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ations allegedly first became subject to measure. Rarely has a court had
such an opportunity to establish decisive tort law policy through an
"interpretation" of -a statutory term. The court might have gone either
way on the issue, as the precedent was indecisive.118 Unfortunately the
court took the more conservative view. It held that the plaintiff's cause
of action accrued at the time when the physical alterations took place.
Significantly, however, the court was able to cite only two cases for its
view, and neither of these was really in point nor more than remotely anal-
ogous."1
9
In another recurring situation, the "capable of ascertainment" test
has proved inappropriate and unjust. This involves wrongful confinement
in a mental institution. The logical trap from which the courts have been
unable to devise a release results because a person who is wrongfully
confined is obviously able to ascertain his injury from the moment of con-
finement. Where the confinement is based upon what the plaintiff claims
is a false assertion of insanity, the plaintiff is denied the benefit of the
tolling provision applicable to insane persons. To confer it would be in-
118. None of the cases cited by the St. Louis Court of Appeals involved a
tort action for personal injuries. Factually closest were two cases dealing. with
whether the failure of an employer to report a workman's injury to the Industrial
Commission tolls the statute of limitations applicable to workmen's compensation
claims. One case said "yes." Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Product, Inc.,
224 Mo. App. 304, 25 S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930). But this case was over-
ruled by the second case which said "no." Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 328
Mo. 888, 42 S.W.2d 579 (1931). Neither case turned on whether the statute might
begin to run at a time before the employee was aware of the injury.
119. Fichtner v. Mohr, 223 Mo. App. 752, 16 S.W.2d 739 (St. L. Ct. App.
1929) (claim against bank directors for accepting a deposit while insolvent-
statute began to run when liquidation commenced by Missouri Banking Depart-
ment); Eoff v. Clay, 9 Mo. App. 176 (St. L. Ct. App. 1880) (damage action for
procuring a void judgment barred by statute which began to run when judgment
obtained and for which an alternative remedy lay, viz. attack upon the judgment
itself.) It is interesting to note that where the injury is to real property resulting
from the discharge of sewage, at least one decision holds that the statute of limi-
tations with respect to the nuisance does not begin to run until the property owner
is "aware" of the interference. Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d 623, 628 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1958). However, whether the nuisance is permanent or temporary(in determining what measure of damages the landowner recovers) is to be decided
on the basis of the state of the technology existing at the time the condition was
first created, thus the landowner gets the best of both possible worlds. Lewis v.
City of Potosi, 348 S.W.2d 577 (St. L, Mo. App. 1961); Hillhouse v. City of
Aurora, 316 S.W.2d 883, 889 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). Seemingly contrary to the
first Lewis case are Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144
(Mo. En Banc 1939) and Thompson v. City of Springfield, 134 S.W.2d 1082(Spr. Mo. App. 1939), neither of which is referred to by the opinion in the first
Lewis case, sutpra. However, the different results reached by these two cases may
be explainable in terms of the tendency, at that time, to characterize the actions
as seeking compensation for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Cf.
Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933).
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consistent with the basic theory upon which the action is pressed.' 20
Another tolling provision, applicable where the defendant has prevented
the commencement of an action by an "improper act," has been held
inapplicable to the false imprisonment situation on the rather dubious
theory that another provision of the Chapter on Statutes of Limitation
withholds from the false imprisonment action the benefits of the "improper
act" tolling provision.121
In summary it can be said that in Missouri a legislative choice has
been made which adopts the "capable of ascertainment" test for determin-
ing the point at which the statute of limitations begins to run on a tort
cause of action. The "capable of ascertainment" test is not as liberal
towards plaintiffs as the "discovery" test, but is more liberal than the
"wrongful act" test or the "sustainment of injury" test. The courts, how-
ever, have construed the statute in a very conservative and strict manner.
They have done this by:
(1) refusing to apply the "capable of ascertainment" test where
a statute independently establishes a period of limitation
different from that otherwise prescribed in the general stat-
utes; '2
(2) suggesting that the test is inappropriate where a statute ar-
guably or inferentially establishes a point other than that when
the damages first became capable of ascertainment as the mo-
ment when the statute of limitations should begin to run;123
(3) incorrectly construing an exclusionary provision as denying
to claimants the benefits of certain tolling provisions; and 24
(4) adopting objective standards for determining whether the dam-
ages were "capable of ascertainment" rather than asking
whether, under the particular circumstances, the damages were
capable of ascertainment by this particular plaintiff.125
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider the
question, and at least one court has rejected the view, the clear weight
120. Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d 994 (1945); Note, 12.
Mo. L. REv. 86 (1947).
121. Hellebrand v. Hoctor, 331 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying
notes 178-182 infra.
122. State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. En Banc
1944); 10 Mo. L. REv. 302 (1945).
123. National Credit Associates, Inc. v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954, 959 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1966); See notes 59, 104 supra.
124. Hellebrand v. Hoctor, 331 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1964).
125. E.g. Allison v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771 (St. L. Mo. App.
1933); 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 336.
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of authority is that in actions under the federal tort claims act the accrual
point is determined according to federal law, even though state law other-
wise determines the substantive validity of the claim. 2 The same rule ap-
pears to hold under the Federal Employers Liability Act-that is, the time
at which the action is deemed to accrue is determined by federal lawJ 27
IV. SUSPENSION AND ExTENSION OF !HE STATUTORY PERIOD
It is generally recognized that certain circumstances (e.g. incapacity
of the plaintiff, fraud on the part of the defendant, or absence of the de-
fendant from the jurisdiction) justify either suspending the running of
the statute, or extending the period during which an action may be brought.
This insures that the plaintiff will not be unduly prejudiced by the special
circumstances which have otherwise foreclosed maintenance of his action.
Historically, precedent for such suspension of extension has come from
both law and equity. The suspension of the running of the statute during
times when either plaintiff or defendant is outside the jurisdiction was
known as the "beyond the seas" rule.123 Incorporated as a provision of
the original English statute, the "beyond the seas" rule was extended and
refined by subsequent enactments. 29 Equity jurisdiction accepted, at an
early date, the notion that a limitations period ought not to run during a
period in which the failure of the plaintiff to assert his rights was a direct
result of the "fraud" or other wrongful act of the defendant.130
126. 60 STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964). Kossick v. United States,
330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964); Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir.
1962); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962). Contra Tessier v.
United States, 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959); United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d
961 (5th Cir. 1958) (dictum).
127. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). Urie v. Thompson, 331 U.S. 163 (1949). As
a result of the rule that federal law controls the date of accrual of the cause of
action under FELA, a recovery is possible under this statute when the same
action would be barred if brought as a tort action under Missouri law. Compare
Urie v. Thompson, supra, with Allison v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771
(St. L. Mo. App. 1933).
128. The term was first employed by the early English statute establishing the
exception. 4 Anne, c.16 . § 19 (1705). It was carried to the U.S. See Act of July
4, 1807, 1 Mo. TERu. LAws 144 (".... or beyond sea . . ."). See also Keeton's Heirs
v. Keeton's Adm'r, 20 Mo. 530 (1855).
129. The term "beyond the seas" was apparently eliminated in 1857. § 12,
at 78, RSMo 1856. It does not appear in today's statute. § 516.200, RSMo 1959.
. 130. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); 1 WooD, LIMITATIONS 266-
67 (4th ed. 1916); Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation, 31
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Today, the sources of the different rules which would suspend or ex-
tend the limitations periods have only a historical significance. In Mis-
souri, as in most states, the rules governing suspension and extension of
the otherwise applicable statutes of limitation have been codified, or, at
least, enacted into statutory law.13' In Missouri ten independent provi-
sions establish circumstances under which statutes of limitation are
either suspended or extended. Those ten provisions may be grouped into
five categories.
1. Outside of the State, provision is made for suspension of
the period of limitations during such times as the defendant, who is
a resident of the State, shall be outside the state;132
2. Personal Disabilities, provision is made for suspension of
the period of limitations during such periods as the plaintiff may
be disabled from suing by reason of minority, insanity, incarcera-
tion, or an enemy alien;133
3. Related Judicial Proceedings, where the maintenance of
the suit has been stayed by injunction provision is made for a
suspension of the period of limitations, and, similarly, provision is
made for a one year extension if plaintiff should suffer a "nonsuit,
reversal, or arrest of judgment"; 3 4
4. Defendant's Improper Act, provision is made for suspend-
ing the running of the statute where the defendant by his own act
or acts prevents the plaintiff from instituting action; 3 5
5. Death, since many actions now survive, provision is made
for extending the time during which any action may be brought
for a period of one year from the death of the party otherwise en-
titled to sue but unable to do so because under one of the disabil-
ities of section 516.170. Similarly, if suit has been brought and the
plaintiff dies, a one year extension of the statute is automatically
granted, regardless of whether the statute would run within a
lesser period. The same one year extension is granted where there
must be a substitution of defendants because of the death of the
primary defendant. 13 6
131. See notes 132-136 infra.
132. § 516.200, RSMo 1959.
133. § 516.170, RSMo 1959.
134. § 516.230, RSMo 1959 (nonsuit, arrest of judgment, reversal of judg-
ment); § 516.260, RSMo 1959 (commencement stayed by injunction).
135. § 516.280, RSMo 1959. The statutory language, if taken literally, would
suspend the running of the statute where the plaintiff is prevented from suing be-
cause of actions by persons other than the defendant ("If any person . . ."). This
has been construed, however, to mean only the defendant. Wells v. Halpin, 59 Mo.
92 (1875).
136. §§ 516.180, .240, .250, RSMo 1959.
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These five categories will be considered in the order presented above.
A. Outside thl State
Although Missouri has a specific provision suspending the running of
the statute of limitation during such times as the defendant is outside the
state it has been held that, even in the absence of such a statute, suspen-
sion would ensue as a' matter of common law.137 Unlike the limitation pro-
vision for wrongful death actions, which suspends the running of the
limitation for defendants who are absent from the state irrespective of
residency, 38 the general suspension statute applies only to residents who
depart from or who are absent from the state. Thus, a defendant who is
not a resident of Missouri at the time the cause of action accrues is not
subject to the suspension provision. The applicable statute of limitation
will run in his favor although he is not present within the State of Mis-
souri. 39 Similarly, in the case of a resident, if a residence is retained in
Missouri the statute is not suspended even though the resident acquired
a "domicile" outside the state. The theory is that so long as an opportunity
to obtain service upon the defendant within the state is available the
tolling provision of the statute is inapplicable. 40 It follows, a fortiori, that
temporary or episodic absences from the state will not toll the statute.141
Owing to the increased facility by which in personam jurisdiction can
now be acquired over extra-territorial persons and entities, the "outside
the state" suspension provision has not created any significant problems
in recent years. With respect to the parallel limitation that applies to ac-
tions for wrongful death, but which is made applicable to residents and
nonresidents alike, it has been recently held that the statute of limitation
is not suspended if the plaintiff may obtain service on the nonresident by
virtue of the provision of the Missouri nonresident motorist statute. 4
Although the decision is consistent with earlier interpretations of the gen-
eral provision suspending the running of the statute during times when
the defendant is "outside the state," the Kansas City Court of Appeals
137. Cobb v. Houston, 117 Mo. App. 645, 94 S.W. 299 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906).
But see Airy v. Swinford, 154 Mo. App. 728, 136 S.W. 728 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
138. § 537.100, RSMo 1967 Supp.
139. Carter v. Bums, 332 Mo. 1128, 61 S.W.2d 933 (1933).
140. Bensley v. Haeberle, 20 Mo. App. 648 (St. L. Ct. App. 18865.
141. Garth v. Robards, 20 Mo. 523 (1855). See 12 WHEATON AND BLACKMAR,
MISSOURi PRAcricE 687-90 (1965).
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It would be unfair if statutes of limitation were permitted to run in
favor of defendants during periods when the persons aggrieved were
physically or legally unable to proceed against such defendants. Accord-
ingly there are a number of statutory conditions which cause the suspen-
sion of the running of the limitations period during such intervals of physi-
cal or legal incapacity. 44
A relatively anachronistic provision was transparently designed to
protect those who had supported the insurgents during the Civil War, or
who were resident in rebel states during that period. It provides that when
the United States is at war with another "country" the time during which
such war ensues shall not be deemed a part of any of the general limitation
periods with respect to causes of action held by aliens, subjects, or citizens
of the "country" at war with the United States.' 45 It is not certain whether
enemy aliens during World Wars I and II ever sought the protection of
this statute. The only reported cases concern causes of action pressed by
citizens of States in rebellion against the United States between 1861 and
1866.140
One of the disabilities which operates to suspend the normal protec-
tion accorded by the statute of limitation is that of "infancy." Although
an infant may maintain a tort action through a duly appointed guardian,
curator, or next friend, the cases uniformly hold that the period of limita-
tion applicable to his claim does not begin to run until he reaches ma-
jority.147 Thus, in an action for loss of consortium resulting from an injury
sustained by plaintiff's husband before plaintiff attained her majority, the
statute of limitation did not begin to run on the claim until the wife
143. Id. at 345.
144. §§ 516.170, .120, RSMo 1959.
145. § 516.210, RSMo 1959. The statute was construed not to apply where
both parties lived in states whose governments were disloyal to the United States.
Smith v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 64 Mo. 330 (1876). Nor was it construed
applicable to causes of action accruing before the government of the state in which
they accrued formerly declared itself in revolt. Hammond v. Johnston, 93 Mo.
198, 6 S.W. 83 (1887).
146. Ibid. See also McMerty v. Morrison, 62 Mo. 140 (1876).
147. The provisions which enable infants to maintain actions through guardians,
curators, or "next friends" are found in §§ 507.110-.220, RSMo 1959. See State v.
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reached her majority even though there appeared to be alternative meth-
ods by which the claim might have been litigated before that time.1 4
The statute does not run while the plaintiff is imprisoned on a criminal
charge, or serving sentence from a criminal court, for a less term than his
natural life.' 49 The period of limitation is tolled even though the prisoner
may arguably maintain an action through a trustee appointed pursuant
to Missouri statutes for the purpose of managing a convict's estate during
periods of confinement. 50 One anomalous result of this is that a convict
has a much greater interval within which to press a tort claim than the
ordinary citizen.
The statutory requirement that the confinement be for a.". . less term
than for his natural life. .." has harsh consequences for persons whose life
sentences are subsequently commuted. The statute is not tolled for such
persons. The Supreme Court has reluctantly held that the strict words of
the statute apply where a person imprisoned under a life sentence, which is
later commuted, attempts to recover from those who have allegedly de-
prived him of his inheritance. 151
Insanity is specifically enumerated as a ground for tolling the statute
of limitation, but plaintiffs' attempts to bring themselves within the
protection of this tolling provision have not proved successful. Where a
person has been confined under an allegedly incorrect certification of in-
sanity, the Missouri Supreme Court has refused to rule that the statute
was suspended during the confinement period. This is because the plaintiff's
theory (that the confinement was wrongful because plaintiff was ?ot in-
sane) is inconsistent with the condition for suspension (insanity) .152 If
there is evidence in the record that is inconsistent with the plaintiff's claim
of insanity the court, as a matter of law, may rule against the plea and
hold that the statute of limitation has run. 153
148. Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1965).
149. § 516.170, RSMo 1959.
150. §§ 460.010-.250, RSMo 1959. This provision is a considerable qualification
to another enactment purporting to suspend all civil rights. § 222.010, RSMo 1959.
The latter has been narrowly construed. The former was liberally construed by a
decision in effect holding that a convict has a right to the appointment of a trustee
to act for him in civil matters. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 228 Mo. 635, 129 S.W.
21 (Mo. 1910); Nelson, The Effect of State Statutes on the Civil Rights of Con-
victs, 47 MINN. L. REv. 835, 841 (1963). For a discussion of problems arising as to
the point in time at which a convict's disability begins, and concerning whether it
subsists during periods when the prisoner is free on bond, see Inglish, Civil Dis-
ability-When Does It Begin?, 16 Mo. L. REV. 136 (1951).
151. Hunter v. Hunter, 361 Mo. 799, 237 S.W.2d 100 (1951).
152. Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d 994 (1945).
153. Kern v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 260 F. Supp. 378 (E.D.Mo. 1966).
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One statutory proVision suspends the running of the statute"where' a
§ uift on a cause of action is stayed b r injunction: The" 'other statutory
prbvision creates a period of "grace" where plaintiff suffers a nibnsuit br
arrest or reveirsal of a judgment in his favor where the statute of limitation
wvould otherwise prevent a new action from being instituted.654
The provision suspending the running of the statute during the interval
where the prosecution of the action has been stayed by injunction is not
cbntroversial. The only problem is its applicability where the prosecution
has been stayed by a writ of prohibition, rather than by -injunction. The
Missouri Supreme Court has held that the original action is not ontinued
by the issuance of a writ of prohibition challenging reinstatement of tle
case on the trial court's docket subsequent to a dismissal for failure to
prosecute.1 5 In that case the Court also held that the running of the
statute' was not tolled during the period in which the prohibition proceed-
ings took place.
Example 13: Four years and nine months following an acci-
dent plaintiff's personal injury action based thereon is dismissed
by the trial court for failure to prosecute. One month later plain-
tiff's motion to reinstate the cause on the circuit court's docket is
granted. One month following the reinstatement (still within the
five year limitation applicable to the cause) the defendant seeks an
original writ of prohibition in the Missouri Supreme Court chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the trial court to reinstate the action
under these circumstances. Eighteen months later the writ of pro-
hibition is affirmed and made final. Plaintiff cannot begin a new
action although he might have done so at any time within ofie
year following the initial dismissal by the trial court for failure to
prosecute. Thus, plaintiff should have instituted a new action in-
stead of merely moving for reinstatement. Similarly, he would have
been able to begin a new action had the restraint on the trial court
been in the form of an injunction rather than a writ of prohibition,
although whether an injunction might have been appropriate is
open to question.
The other provision permits a new action to be brought within a
period of one year following the dismissal of an action that was timely
begun but which was terminated because of a nonsuit, arrest of judgment,
154. § 516.230, RSMo 1959 (nonsuit, arrest of judgment, or reversal of judg-
ment); § 516.260, RSMo 1959 (stay by injunction).
155. Myers v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 233 Mo. App. 730, 125
S.W.2d 950 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939). .
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or reversal of judgment rather than on the merits. 5 6 Such 'a -statute has
been designated a "'saving statute," a "renewal statute," or an "extension
statute."11r7
It is clear that the purpose of the statute is to extend and not to
shorten the statutory period.
Example 14: Six months following the accident, A brings an
action against B for personal injuries. Six months after the action
is brought (one year following the accident) A suffers an order of
nonsuit. Two years following the order of nonsuit, A files a new
action against B. A's action is not barred, even though he has
failed to commence a new action within one year after suffering
the nonsuit. The reason A's action is not barred is that the new
action has been brought within the five-year period applicable to
his personal inju y claim.158
The provision "extends" the statutory period even though the nonsuit
or arrest of judgment has been suffered at a time outside the limitations
period.
Example 15: four years following the accident, A brings action
against B for personal injuries. Eighteen months later A suffers a
nonsuit or arrest of judgment. A has one year within which to bring
a new action even though the limitations period had expired at the
time of the nonsuit.159
An independent provision, identical to the provision in Chapter 516,
covers actions for wrongful death which, as has been noted earlier, are not
otherwise eligible for the general savings provisions of Chapter 516.160
Without a specific provision to provide for an interval of "grace" following
a nonsuit, however, a statutory cause of action containing its own limita-
tion period cannot be revived following such nonsuit. This produces the
following anomaly:
156. § 516.230, RSMo 1959.
157. See, e.g., Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1043, 1045 (1966).
158. Valley Farm Dairy Co. v. Horstmeier, 420 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1967).
159. See, e.g., Scanlon v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 125, 28 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. En
Banc 1930) (injury in 1900; dismissal in 1915; action begun again within one year
in 1916; judgment in 1930: action not barred.)
160. § 537.100, RSMo 1967 Supp. The ineligibility of the wrongful death action
for the tolling provisions of §§ 516.100-.290, RSMo 1959 was made clear in the
leading case of Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); Note, 24 Mo. L.
REv. 397 (1959); Note, 35 N.D.L. REv. 171 (1959). See also, Comment, First
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Example 16: an action against a sheriff and his surety com-
pany on the sheriff's bond is covered by section 516.130, RSMo
1959, which establishes a limitation period of three years. Action
is begun within the three year period, but is terminated by the
plaintiff through a voluntary nonsuit at a point in time over three
years after the cause of action accrued. Plaintiff has one year with-
in which to institute a new action.16'
Example 17: same facts as in example "16" except that the
suit is against a surety on a constable's bond. Plaintiff's action'is
barred because a special statute governs such suits and they are not
encompassed by the "savings" provisions of section 516.230, RSMo
1959.162
Venue is a waivable requirement and, at least in that sense, "nonjuris-
dictional."'163 Therefore a nonsuit entered against a plaintiff who sued de-
fendant in a county where venue requirements were absent should qualify
for the savings provision. In that case the plaintiff would have twelve
months within which to begin anew in the correct county. While most of
the cases in Missouri have permitted this, it is subject to the requirement
that the mistake be in good faith.164 Krueger v. Walters,"65 one of several
cases holding the other way, has been explained in terms of the failure of
the plaintiff to offer an explanation for the mistaken venue, thus justifying
an inference that the action was "knowingly" brought in violation of the
161. State v. Litzinger, 417 S.W.2d 126 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
162. State v. Harter, 188 Mo. 516, 87 S.W. 941 (1905). Contra, State v.
Weathers, 396 S.W.2d 746 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965). The Weathers case turned,
however, on the existence of a special statute governing bonds for constables of
St. Louis City. Unlike the general statutory provision governing constables' bonds,
the provision dealing with St. Louis City contained no special period of limitation.
It was therefore considered eligible for the tolling provisions of Chapter 516, RSMo
1959. See note 32 supra.
163. Hutchinson v. Steinke, 353 S.W.2d 137 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962). But see
State v. Higgins, 352 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. En Banc 1961), following a line of cases
declaring that failure to comply with a venue requirement is a jurisdictional de-
fect. The distinction that the cases fail to draw is that between subject matter and
person. The former cannot be waived and is truly jurisdictional. The latter can be
waived and is jurisdictional only in the sense that "in personam" jurisdiction has
not been obtained. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1963).
164. State v. Litzinger, 417 S.W.2d 126 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967); Ellmaker v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 372 S.W.2d 650 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); Tice v.
Milner, 308 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1957); Slater v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 271
S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1954); Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S.W.2d 947 (1943).
165. 238 Mo. App. 340, 179 S.W.2d 615 (K.C. Ct. App. 1944). See also Jack-
son v. Whitaker, 386 S.W.2d 657 (K.C. Mo App. 1964); Phillips v. Whittom, 354
Mo. 964, 192 S.W.2d 856 (1946); Mertens v. McMahon, 115 S.W.2d 180 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1938); Conrad v. McCall, 205 Mo. App. 640, 226 S.W. 265 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1920); Hardin v. Cass County, 42 Fed. 652 (W.D. Mo. 1890).
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venue requirements. Why the eligibility of an action for the savings pro-
visions of sections 512.230 and 537.100 should depend upon the state of
mind of the attorneys is a mystery to the author. Other sanctions are
available against causing intentional inconvenience through persistent
actions in counties without venue.166 The truth is that in these cases Mis-
soun courts have not distinguished between venue and jurisdiction. They
have been misled into equating a venue defect with absence of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Recent cases suggest a more charitable attitude on the part of the
courts. The benefit of a savings provision probably will not be denied a
plaintiff -nonsuited because of a venue defect, and otherwise barred by the
statute of limitation, if the plaintiff can offer a reasonable explanation for
the error.167
Whether a cause of action having its origin in another state qualifies
for this saving provision depends upon how the action and the limitation
are classified by the other State.
Example 18: A negligence action is instituted in Missouri
based upon personal injuries sustained in Kansas. Kansas has a
two year statute of limitation on such actions. It is clear that
under its "borrowing" statute, Missouri will apply that limitation.
Action is brought within the two year period but terminates in a
nonsuit outside the two year period. Section 516.230, RSMo 1959
applies and the plaintiff has twelve months within which to begin
a new action.168
Example 19: Same facts as in Example "18" except that the
action is for wrongful death. Missouri has a twelve months savings
period specifically applicable to the nonsuited wrongful death ac-
tion. No comparable provision exist§ in Kansas. Since Kansas re-
gards the limitation period applicable to the wrongful death
action as "built in" the substantive right, the Missouri "savings"
clause cannot apply, and the action is barred.' 69
There is an overlooked difficulty which occasionally arises in connec-
tion with this "savings" provision. A failure to clear the docket may result
166. E.g., abuse of process. White v. Scarritt, 341 Mo. 1004, 111 S.W.2d 18
(1937); Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 283 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1955) (dictum);
Thompson v. Farmers' Exchange Bank, 333 Mo. 437, 62 S.W.2d 803 (1933) (dic-
tum); PROSSMR, ToRTs 876-78 (3d ed. 1964).
167. E.g., Emanuel v. Richards, 426 S.W.2d 716 (Sf. L. Mo. App. 1968):
Compare Ellmaker v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 372 S.W.2d 650 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963) with Jackson v. Whitaker, 386 S.W.2d 657 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
168. Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455
(1940),
169. Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. 1966).
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in the resurrection of a cause of action as long as thirty years following its
presumed demise. In Scanlon v. Kansas City,17° for example, an acti6n
arising in 1900 was revived over twenty-five years later. It resulted in a
judgment entered in 1930.
'Probably the most liberal case decided under this section is Slater v.
Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. 7' The case originally began as a death ac-
tion finder the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It was discovered, after
the one year statute of limitation had run, that the deceased was not an
employee of the defendant. The. court held that the widow had twelve
months following the dismissal of the FELA action to begin an action for
wrongful death, even though under FELA she sued in a representative
capacity (owing to the "survival" features of the FELA action) while un-
der the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute she must sue as a direct ben6-
ficiary.
D. Defendant's Improper Act
The Missouri statutes provide that if a defendant "... by absconding
or concealing himself, or by any other improper act, prevent the commence-
ment of an action . . ." then the limitation period shall begin to run only
after the maintenance of the action "shall have ceased to be so pre-
vented."'1 2 This rather broad mandate for suspending the statutes of limita-
tion has been conservatively construed. In the vast majority of the cases
in which plaintiffs have sought its protection, it has been held inapplicable.
An early case held that the failure of an employer to report an accident to
Industrial Commission was a "wrongful act" which tolled the otherwise
applicable six month period within which an injured employee must file
his claim.' 73 However this decision was subsequently overruled. Such failure
to report is no longer considered a "wrongful act" within the meaning of
the statutory provision suspending the operation of the- limitation period
170. 325 Mo. 125, 28 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. En Banc 1930).
171. 271 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1954). Contra, Bodine v. Lloyd, 5 N.E.2d 108 (Ill.
App. 1936). Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act one suit is maintained for
both the survival and wrongful death claims. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964). In Missouri
the actions are mutually exclusive. In the event of wrongful death the widow sues
in her own right for wrongful death, and not as a personal representative. §$37.080 (1), RSMo 1967 Supp. (wrongful death-who sues); § 537.020, RSMo
1959 (if wrongful act produces death, action does not survive).
172. § 516.280, RSMo 1959.
173. Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Product, Inc., 224 Mo. App. 304, 25
S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930), overruled, Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
note 174 infra. ,
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on that account.174-Similarly, some earlier cases held that'the fraud of a.A
notary public that prevented an aggrieved person from obtaining .thp
knowledge which would have permitted prompt action for relief was, a
"wrongful act" that suspended the period of limitation applicable to an
action on the notary's bondYt 5 A more recent case repudiated this notion.
It held that since the action on the bond is pursuant to a special statute
the wrongful act exception, is inapplicable because this exception applies
only to "general" statutes of limitation and not to those special statutes
which create their own periods of limitations. 16
The foregoing cases illustrate a clear reluctance to give the "wrongL
iul act" tolling provision a literal effect. Whether the courts are fearful that
a literal application of the exception would provide too easy an escape
from the statutes of limitation, 'or whether this is 'simply another manifesta-
tion of the modern tendency to give such statutes a strict application77 is
not clear. However, none of them go so far as the Federal Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit." In a decision of questionable accuracy it virtually
nullified all of the statutory provisions suspending or extending the running
of the limitations periods where plaintiff is under one or more of the dis-
abilities discussed in this section. Hellebrand v. Hoctor"78 was a di-
versity action for false imprisonment in which the Missouri law controlled.
Th. action was not brought within the two year period as required in Mis-
souri. The plaintiff alleged that the statute was suspended because the
defendant had prevented his commencement of the action by his "improper
act" (presumably his unlawful detention of the plaintiff). The logic of
the plaintiff's argument seems beyond cavil-a defendant ought not to be
permitted physically to bar the plaintiff from the courthouse for two years
and then plead the running of the two year statute of limitations. The
Court of Appeals, however, did just that in the Hellebrand case by holding
that th& "wrongful act" provision did not'apply to suspend the running of
174. Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 328 Mo. 888, 42 S.W.2d 579 (1931)..
175. State v. American Surety Co., 254 S.W. 561 (St. L. Mo. App. 1923);
State v. American Surety Co:, 203 Mo. App. 71, 217 S.W. 317 (St. L. Ct. App,
1920); State v. Hawkins, 103 Mo. App. 251, 77 S.W. 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903).
176. Kohout v. Adler, 327 S.W.2d 492 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); Note, 26 Mo. L.
Rnv. 80 (1961).
177. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 746, 190- S.W.2d 994, 996
(1945): "But, while statutes of limitations were formerly regarded with little
favor and courts devised numerous theories and expedients for their evasion, lat.-
terly they are considered as beneficial, as resting upon the sound public policy,
and as not to be evaded except by the methods provided therein." Note, '12 Mo.' L.
REv. 86 (1947);-
178. 331 FK2d 453 (8th Cir, 1964).. 7 .. ,
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that statute "bf 'limitation applicable to actions for false imprisonment.
Why was' the running of the statute not suspended by the manifestly im-
proper act of the defendant? Because of another statute which reads as
follows:
The provisions of section 516.010 to 516.370 shall not extend
to any action which is or shall be otherwise limited by any
statute; but such action shall be brought within the time limited
by such statute. 79
The court reasoned as follows. (1) the "improper act" provision (516.280)
is within the spectrum of exclusion; and (2) since 516.140 is a statute
which limits the time within which an action for false imprisonment may
be brought, it is an "... action which is . . . otherwise limited by . . .
statute." Therefore, the suspension provision applicable where defendant
is guilty of improper acts which prevent the plaintiff from maintaining
his action within the statutory period does not apply.
The critical words, of course, are "otherwise limited by any statute."
Under the interpretation applied in Hellebrand the improper act suspension
provision would never apply because all (or almost all) limitation periods
are imposed by statute. Under the court's reading they would, by defini-
tion, be ineligible for many of the savings provisions set forth in Chapter
516. A more reasonable interpretation of the phrase "otherwise limited
by any statute" is that it identifies limitations specifically imposed by
statutes "otherwise" than in Chapter 516, as, for example, the independent
limitation created on the action for wrongful death.8s0 The legislature some-
times has seen fit to establish a limitation period on a given right of action
that is independent from the general limitations established under Chapter
516 (E.g., wrongful death actions and actions on notary bonds). 181 It has
been held that only where this is done may the legislature be presumed to
have intended that the limitation period not be subject to the various
savings provisions found in Chapter 516.182 The same reasoning is appro-
priate to the foregoing problem. For these reasons the interpretation of
section 516.300 made by the federal court in Hellebrand seems erroneous.
179. § 516.300, RSMo 1959.
180. § 537.100, RSMo 1967 Supp.
181, Ibid. § 486.050, RSMo 1959. Kohout v. Adler, 327 S.W.2d 492 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1959); Note, 26 Mo. L. REv. 80 (1961).
. 182. Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R, Co., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455
(1940) (defendant's argument that the saving provision in the event of -non~uit
was inapplicable because the action was "otherwise limited" by the'Kansas limita-
tion made applicable under § 516.190, RSMo 1959 was clearly' iejicted.) 
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A more logical but equally unfair refusal to extend application of the
"imptoper act" provision may be found in the case of Frazee v. Partney 83
discussed above.' 8 4 That case involved an action for wrongful death. It was
over a year after the collision before the plaintiff, despite unremitting
efforts, was able to identify the operator of the motor vehicle who had al-
legedly caused the death of plaintiff's wife. Because the wrongful death
action carries its own "built in" statute of limitation, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that it did not qualify for the "improper act" savings provision
of Chapter 516, and that the action was therefore barred. 8 5
E. Extensions in Case of Death,
Three statutory provisions deal with three different limitations prob-
lems which arise in connection with death. At least one of these provisions
(the third one to be discussed) presents difficult questions of interpretation
and application.
Section 516.180, RSMo 1959 is designed to guard against the loss to
the estate of a decedent of a cause of action that survives the decedent's
death but which could not previously have been maintained because of
some disability that disqualified the decedent from suing during his life-
time. The effect of the statute is to give the personal representative at
least one year following the death of such a decedent to bring an action on
such claim or claims as survive, regardless of whether the limitation pe-
riod would have expired during some lesser interval following death.
Three points seem noteworthy- First, the statute apparently applies
only to claims which the decedent could not have pressed during his life-
time because of the disabilities specified in section 516.170, RSMo 1959.
Second, while the statute may extend the limitation period on a given cause
of action for one year following the death of the person otherwise disabled
from pressing it, it also seems to foreclose suit after that point, even though
the normal limitations period would establish a latter point.'88 Third, the
extension period runs from the time of death, and not from the point at
which an administrator is appointed or an executor qualifies. 187
183. 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); cf. authorities cited note 160 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 52 and 53 supra. See also State ex rel. Bier
v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. En Banc 1944); Note, 10 Mo. L.
REv. 302 (1945).
185. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); Note, 24 Mo. L. REV.
397 (1959); Note, 35 N.D.L. Rav. 171 (1959). See also Comment, First Catch Your
Defendant-Limitation and the Unknown Tortfed,-or, 29" Mo. L. REv. 366 (1966).
186. Smith v. Settle, 128 Mo. App. 379, 107 S.W. 430 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
187.: § 516.180, RSMo 1959. Clubine v. Frazer, 346 Mo. 1, 139 S.W.2td 529
(1940).
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Example 20: Four years and six months after sustaining
personal injuries as the result of D's negligence, ,A dies from
causes unrelated to these injuries. Five years and four months
after the injuries were inflicted, and ten months following the
death of A, A's administrator sues D. The administrator's action
is barred because brought more than five years ifter the action
accrued.
Example 21: Same facts as in Example "20," eicept that A
dies one year after the injuries were inflicted. A's administrator
would appear to have four years within which io bring the sur-
vival action.188
Example 22: Same facts as in Example "20," except that A
was insane both at the time of injury and at-the time of death.
The administrator's action is not barred.
The second statutory provision, section 516.250, RSMo 1959 ,deals
with the problems which can arise when the plaintiff dies after an action
has been begun. In such an event the action must be begun anew by the
executor or administrator if it would otherwise survive. He or she has one
year from the time of the decedent's death in which to institute the new
action in the name of the representative. Although there are no cases deal-
ing with the question, it appears that this provision can result in an
abbreviation of the cause of action.
Example 23: Four years and six months following a motor
vehicle collision, A sues D for damages for personal injuries re-
sulting therefrom. Nine months following the filing of suit A dies
from causes unrelated to the motor vehicle collision. A's executor .
or administrator has one year from the time of A's death within
which to begin an action on the claim, even though more than five
years has elapsed from the time of injury.
Example 24: Same facts as in Example "23" except that A
begins his action within six months of its accrual and dies six
188. These examples are submitted to illustrate the point that the normal
period of limitation is altered by death only where (1) the plaintiff was statutorily
disabled from suing during his lifetime, § 516.180, RSMo 1959; or (2) where the
plaintiff had initiated suit and thereafter died, § 516.250, RSMo 1959; or plaintiff
had initiated suit and defendant thereafter died, § 516.240, RSMo 1959. Where
defendant dies before suit is brought, or where plaintiff dies from causes unrelated
to those upon which a cause of action is subsequently pressed by his personal rep-
resentative, the limitationis period is unaltered.,§§ 537.010-.020, RSMo 1959. How-
ever, even though the normal period of limitation is'unaltere.d,. where the defendant
has died, plaintiff may not be able to execute a judgment against the estate of. the
decedent if he fails to comply with the nonclaim statute. °§ 473.360, RSMo 1959.
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* months thereafter. It appears that A's executor or administrator
has only one year from the datepof A's death (two years from the
date of injury) within which to begin a new action, even though
the normal period of limitations would have been five years.
The statute also provides for the event of the death of the executor or
administrator. The personal representative who succeeds to that office shall
have at least one year from the time of the first representative's death in
which to begin an action.
Example 25: Four' years and six months following a motor
vehicle collision John Smith sues D for damages resulting there-'
from. Nine months following the filing of suit John Smith dies
from causes unrelated to the motor vehicle collision. Mary Smith,
his wife, is executrix under John Smith's will and six months fol-
lowing his death institutes a new action against D. One month
thereafter Mary Smith dies. Since John Smith made no provision*
for a succeeding executor in his will, and, since Mary Smith has no
will, it is another six months before Jones is appointed adminis-
trator d.b.n.c.t.a. Five months thereafter Jones institutes a new
action against D.The action is not barred even though it is begun
21 months after the time when the statute of limitations would
have normally barred the claim and 18 months after the death of
the original plaintiff.
The statute is in exactly the same words as it existed in the 1835 Re-
vised Statutes,ssa except for a clause appended in 1857. That clause reads
as follows:
. . . or, if no executor or administrator be appointed within that
time, then within one year after letters testamentary or of ad-
ministration shall have been granted to him. 8 9
The intention of the 1857 amendment seems plain enough-to save
the cause of action in situations where there is more than a year's delay
in the qualification or appointment of a personal representative. However,
the clause is ambiguous. Placed in the position as it is, it could be con-
strued to apply only to the situation where the first personal representatives
dies and there is a lapse of more than a year before a successor qualifies ot
is appointed. Assuming, however, that it would cover the situation where
188A. § 5 at -, RSMo 1835.
189. § 5 at p. 80, RSMo 1857 (Volume sometimes dated "1856").
19681
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
there is a delay of more than a year before a personal representative qualifies
or is appointed; the following anomaly results:
Example 26: Four years and six months following the collision
John Smith sues D for damages and dies from unrelated causes
nine months thereafter. Mary Smith, his wife, qualifies as executrix
exactly 364 days after John Smith's death. Mary Smith has one
day in which to begin a new action against D. Otherwise the action
is barred.
Example 27: Same facts as in Example "26," except that
Mary Smith qualifies 380 days following John Smith's death. Mary
Smith has a full year within which to begin the new action.
The only significant case interpreting this rather ambiguous provision
dealt with its applicability to a wrongful death action. There, owing to the
failure of other named statutory beneficiaries, the action had to be brought
by the administrator of the decedents estate. The court held, quite proper-
ly, that these provisions did not apply when the administrator or executor
becomes the person qualified to sue under the wrongful death statute. 19 0
This is because the action for wrongful death in Missouri is not a survival
statute, but an independent cause of action created by statute.,,,
The third statutory provision, section 516.240, RSMo 1959 provides
for a nine months suspension of the statute of limitation for actions which
survive the death of the defendant, and with respect to which the statute
might otherwise run. Analytically read, this statute authorizes an abbrevia-
tion of the limitations period, although the only case dealing with the ques-
tion does not so assume.192 This abbreviation would result from the sub-
stitution of new alternative periods of limitation-one year within which
to bring the new action against the heirs, devisees or assigns of the defend-
ant, or nine months following the first publication of notice of letters testa-
190. Pyle v. University City, 279 S.W. 217 (St. L. Mo. App. 1925).
191. § 537.080, RSMo 1967 Supp.; Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.
1963); Spencer v. Bradley, 351 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1961).
192. Doerge v. Heimenz, 1 Mo. App. 238 (St. L. Ct. App. 1876) (Plaintiff
failed to renew his action against the administrator within one year from the death
of the original defendant. The court held the action barred, but emphasized that
the general statute of limitations had run on the claim.) See also City of Spring-
field v. Clement et a2., 296 Mo. 150. 246 S.W. 175 (1922) (City sought indemnity
from legatees of decedent some years following payment of sidewalk tort claim.
Claim was held barred-not because of a failure to comply with the predecessor of
§ 516.240, RSMo 1959, but because at that time tort actions of this type did not
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mentary or of administration, in the event that an executor or adniinis-
trator is appointed.193
A logical question arises with respect to the disposition of any survival
action which may have been reinstituted against an heir, devisee, or assign
within one year after the death of the tortfeasor but prior to the appoint-
ment of an executor or administrator. Several cases, by way of dicta, indi-
cate that the heirs may be liable under such circumstances, at least to the
extent of their distributive shares. 94 The question is academic however.
Even if the subsequently appointed administrator or executor were not held
to be a necessary party to any such survival action previously instituted,
since the heirs, devisees, or assigns would appear to be jointly liable, 9 5 the
results would be the same. No apparent advantage accrues to the plaintiff
from following the rather circuitous procedure of proceeding against the
heirs, devisees, or assigns, and waiting until the assets are formally trans-
ferred to them before executing on his judgment.
The existence of alternative periods within which to begin the action
is, however, the important characteristic of the statutory provision.
Example 28: X commits a tort against P which is subject to
a five year limitation period. Four years and nine months after
the cause of action accrues, P sues X. Six months thereafter (five
years and three months after the cause of action accrued) P re-
news his action against X's heirs, devisees or assigns. P's action is
not barred, although it would be barred were he to wait more than
one year after X's death before suing X's heirs, devisees or assigns.
Example 29: Same facts as in Example "28" except that P
does nothing about renewing his action for fifteen months following
X's death. Notice of letters testamentary are published thirteen
months following X's death. Although P's action against the heirs,
devisees or assigns is barred, he has nine months from the date up-
on which the letters testamentary were first published within which
to renew the same action against X's personal representative.
193. § 516.240, RSMo 1959. The alternative period of nine months following
the publication of notice of letters testamentary or administration was no doubt
added so as to make this provision conform with the nonclaim statute. § 473.360,
RSMo 1959. See Clarke v. Organ, 329 S.W.2d 670, 679 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
194. City of Springfield v. Clement et d., 296 Mo. 150, 246 S.W. 175 (1922)
(semble); Beekman v. Richardson, 150 Mo. 430, 51 S.W. 689 (1899) (dictum);
Walker v. Deaver, 79 Mo. 664 (1883) (dictum).
195. § 516.240, RSMo 1959 (".... plaintiff may commence a new action against
the heirs, devisees, assigns, executors or administrators of such defendant, as the
case may require ... "') (Emphasis added.)
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I'It, Mould. be deceptive not to mention that section 516.240 means
nothing if it is not considered in connection with section 473.360, the so-
called "nonclaim" statute. This statute forecloses a claimant from recover-
ing anyjudgment against an executor, administrator, distributee, or any
other person receiving assets administered by the probate court unless
written notice of the action instituted or revived is filed in the probate court
within nine months from the date upon which letters testamentary are first
published.
. It is no coincidence that the nine month interval for filing corresponds
with the nine month interval during which the statute of limitation is
deemed tolled.'00 Before 1959 the statute barred the action, rather than
prohibiting recovery of judgment from administered assets. 197 The amend-
ment was seemingly moved by the case of Clarke v. Organ.98 A recovery
on behalf of two orphans for the wrongful death of their parents was de-
feated because of a failure to comply with the nonclaim statute as it was
then worded. What made that case so objectionable was that the ad-
ministratrix in that case had been served in the action and had in fact filed
an answer. Nevertheless, the failure to comply with the nonclaim statute
was deemed fatal. The effect of the amendment of 1959 is to permit the
claimant to recover from an insurance company which is otherwise obliged
to discharge the liability of an assured even though he may not execute
judgment against the "administered assets" of the estate. °9
A final question, for which there appears to be no answer, is whether,
irrespective of the nonclaim statute, the statute of limitation normally
applicable is attenuated by the alternative periods described in section
516.240.
Example 30: X has an automobile liability insurance policy
with the M Company. He operates the covered vehicle in a negli-
196. See note 193 supra.
197. § 473.360, RSMo 1957 Supp., repealed Mo. Laws 1959, S.B. No. 305 § 1,
and § 473.360 RSMo 1959 enacted in its place.
198. 329 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
199. For a discussion of the amendment to the nonclaim statute and its
transparent purpose see Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missourti, 25 Mo. L.
REV. 417, 432 (1960). The amendment has been held not to be retroactive, thereby
foreclosing recovery from a decedent's insurer with respect to a preamendment
claim which had not been filed with the Probate Court within the required time.
State v. Hall, 358 S.W.2d 845 (Mo. En Banc 1962). But see Wentz v. Price Candy
Co., 352 Mo. 1, 175 S.W.2d 852 (1943); 9 Mo. L. REV. 376 (1944). The latter case
held an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Law which extended the
filing period to twelve months reached back and revived a claim otherwise barred
because not filed within the previous limitation period of six months. The court
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gent fashion and- injures P. Three months later X dies. An
executor is appointed, the estate is probated, and the executor dis-
charged. Four years following the collision and two years and six
months following 'the discharge of the executor, P sues X's heirs
and legatees for damages. It is clear that P may not recover any
judgment which he may win from assets of the estate in the hands
of the defendants because of his failure to comply with the non-
claim statute. It is not clear whether the M Insurance Company
can'escape its contractual obligation to assume the liability of X. In
this respect it should be noted that section 516.240, RSMo 1959
uses the permissive "may" rather than the mandatory "must."
In reviewing the circumstances under which the death of either the
plaintiff or the defendant may alter the normal application of the statute
of limitation applicable to a tort cause of action, it may seem illogical not
to include a discussion of the action for wrongful death. However, as
pointed out earlier, the action for wrongful death is an independent tort
cause of action created by statute and carrying its own period of limitation
as well as its own extension provisions in the event of' such things as non-
suit.2°0 It is not considered here because its existence is dependent upon
death and therefore not logically within a discussion of how statutes of
limitation applicable to other causes of action are affected by death.
One critical observation may be made with respect to a problem il-
lustrated by the case of Clarke v. OrgaPn.21 The action in that case was for
wrongful death. The defendant died so we have the not unusual situation
where a guardian sues a personal representative. The legislature has spe-
cifically provided that the action for wrongful death shall survive the death
of the defendant.202 However, if cases such as Hellebrand v. Hoctor203 and
Frazee v. Part-ney20 - are correct, and if section 516.300, RSMo 1959205 is
given a literal interpretation, neither the limitations nor the extensions
200. See cases and statute cited note 191 supra.
201. 329 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1959).
202. § 537.020 (1), RSMo 1959; Comment, The Missouri Wrongful Death
Statute (1963) WAsH. U.L.Q. 125, 137. Even though the torifeasor dies before the
victim for whose death the wrongful death action is brought, the suit may be
maintained. Harrison v. Weisbrod, 358 S.W.2d 277 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
203. 331 F-2d 453 (8th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying notes 178-182 supra.
204. 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); see note 185 supra.
205. § 516.300, RSMo 1959. The nonclaim statute specifies its own independent
period of limitations. Therefore it is not qualified by or subject to the general
tolling provisions of Chapter 516 by virtue of the foregoing section. Thus, a claim
against a decedents estate is barred even though the executrix deliberately leaves
the state so a to make it impossible for service to be made within the statutory
period. Zuckerman v. McCulley, 78 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
1968:3,
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implicit in section 516.240, RSMo 1959 apply where the action is for wrong-
ful death.
Example 31: X negligently causes the death of P's child. One
month later X dies. In order to obtain an enforceable judgment
against the assets of the estate, P must comply with the nonclaim
statute. But P would have twenty-three months from ,the date of
X'sdeath to bring action against the appropriate defendant for
wrongful death, regardless of when the notices of letters testa-
mentary are published under section 516.240, RSMo 1959.206
V. CONFLICTS OF LAW AND THE BoRuowiNG STATUTE
Two rather simple situations provide the basis for a number of com-
plex problems traditionally dealt with under the heading of "Conflict of
Laws." These two situations are exemplified by what follows:
Example 32: P suffers injuries in State A, which has a tyo year
limitation period on normal negligence actions. Three years after
the cause of action accrued, P sues D in State B, which has a five
year limitation on such actions. If State A classifies its limitation
period as "procedural," and if State B has no statute requiring
otherwise, the common law rule allows the action to be main-
tained.20T
Example 33: Same facts as in Example "32" except that P suf-
fers the injuries in State B and brings suit in State A. At common
law P's action is barred. Even if State B has altered the rule by
legislation the action is, by the overwhelming weight of authority,
barred.208
The major complication arises with respect to the classification made
by the state where the cause of action accrues. It is frequently impossible
to establish whether any given state considers, for all purposes, the limita-
tion period as "substantive" or "procedural." However, the significant
aspect of the common law rule is that it permits recovery on an otherwise
barred claim if the forum period is longer than that of the originating State.
Thus, in In re Goldswortly's Estate,209 a contract claim, barred in Missouri,
206. Cf. cases cited note 43 supra.
207. E.g., Barrett v. Boston & M.R.R., 104 N.H. 70, 178 A.2d 291 (1962);
Davison v. Sasse, 72 S.D. 199, 31 N.W.2d 758 (1948); Io re Goldsworthy's Estate,
45 N.M. 406, 115 P.2d 627 (1941).
208. E.g. Jackson v. Shuttleworth, 42 Ill. App.2d 257, 192 N.E.2d 217 (1963).
209. 45 N.M. 406, 115 P.2d 627 (1941).
[Vol. U3
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was enforced in New Mexico. New Mexico had both the common law 'nle
and a longer limitations period than Missouri applicable to such claims.
Many jurisdictions have adopted so-called "borrowing statutes."2 10
Missouri's statute bars the enforcement of a foreign claim in Missouri if
such claim is barred where it accrued, 211 The Missouri statute would pro-
hibit a result such as that reached in the Goldsworthy case.
Example 34: P and D are Missouri residents whose cars col-
lide in Iowa. Three years following the collision P sues D in Mis-
souri for personal injuries arising from the Iowa collision. The Iowa
statute of limitations is two years, the Missouri limitation, five.
Even though Iowa classifies the limitations as "procedural," under
the Missouri "borrowing" statute P's claim is barred.212
It might seem logical, by analogy to the rule that "what is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander," that if the borrowing statute requires
application of a foreign limitation shorter than the forum's, it would also
require the forum to apply a foreign limitation longer than the forum
statute. 213 Except for one jurisdiction,2 14 however, the general rule has al-
ways been the other way.
Example 35: D commits a tort against P in Illinois. Twelve
years later P sues D in Missouri. Even though the action is not
barred in Illinois, the five year statute bars it in Missouri. 21
Unlike a number of other "borrowing" statutes, the Missouri statute
does not make distinctions based upon whether either party was a non-
210. See Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing
Statutes, 32 RocKY MT. L. REV. 287 (1960); Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limita-
tion and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 33 (1962).
211. § 516.180, RSMo 1959.
212. Girth v. Beaty Grocery Co., 407 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1966).
213. Where the limitation period is "built in" to the foreign cause of action
there is authority that an action brought within the "built in" period may be
maintained even though the law of the forum would bar the claim. Martinez v.
Mo. Pac. R.R., 296 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1956); Lang v. J. C. Nichols Inv. Co., 227 Mo.
App. 1123, 59 S.W.2d 63 (K.C. Ct. App. 1933); Newell v. Harrison Eng'r. &
Const. Corp., 149 Kan. 838, 89 P.2d 869 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CON-
FLICT OF LAws, Reporter's Note § 143 at 497 (Proposed Official Draft 1967)
(cases collected.) By analogy, a "borrowing" statute could be said to be "built in"
the limitation applicable in the jurisdiction of accrual, but this position has been
rejected. See notes 214, 215 infra.
214. Kentucky has always been the celebrated "hold out" against the rule that
the shorter forum statute prevails over a longer statute otherwise "borrowed" by
the forum's borrowing statute. See, e.g. Koeppe v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 250
F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1957). However, even Kentucky has now capitulated to the
majority rule, making it, for all practical purposes, unanimous. Seat v. Eastern
(reyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. App. 1965).
215. Farthing v. Sams, 296 Mo. 442, 247 S.W. 111 (1922).
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rdsident' 210-whether a particular ,party had a residence.at- thd time the ar
tion' accrued; 217 whether a particular' party had a residence. at the time the,
lUhir became effective; 218 or whether either party has had a minimum period
df iesidence in the forum state.219 The permutations and combinations *df
the different borrowing- statutes' are masterfully described in an article by
Dean David Vernon,220 but are beyond the scope of-the present discussioi.
Because it does not make distinctions of the type mentioned above, Mis-
souri's statute has the virtue, of simplicity. Few inconsistencies can be
found in the decisions applying it.
A recurring problem in the interpretation and application of the forum's
borrowing statute is the extent to which the "tolling" or "extension" pro-
visions of the jurisdiction in which the cause of action accrues should be
taken into account by the forum jurisdiction in determining whether, for
the purposes of the forum jurisdiction, the action would be barred by the
accrual state. The rule is that if the accrual state would recognize the tollin&
or extension provision a forum state applying a "borrowing" statute must
also recognize it. The language of a Missouri Appeals Court sums up the rule
nicely:
But when such statute is so borrowed, it is not wrenched bodily
out of its own setting, but taken along with- it are the court deci-
sions of its own state which interpret and apply it, and the com-
panion statutes which limit and restrict its operation. This we
think is the general law.221
It'is frequently said, therefore, that in applying the "borrowing" statute
the case.law interpreting the statute must also be borrowed.
Excample 36: D commits a tort against P in Kansas and re-
turns to his residence in Missouri. P, a resident of Kansas, sues D
in Missouri three years after the cause of action accrued. The Kan-
sas period of limitations is two years, the Missouri limitation, five.
Under the Kansas law the Kansas period of limitations is tolled
when the defendant departs from the state. Having departed from
Kansas, the Kansas period is tolled with respect to D. The claim
216. E.g. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12-260 (1967 Repl. Part). Oklahoma, which former-
ly limited its borrowing statute to persons who were nonresidents, recently repealed
the limitation. OKLA. LAWS 1967 c.98, § 1.
217. E.g., IowA Cona ANN. § 614.7 (1950).
218. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-114 (1955).
219. E.g., ARz. Rav. STAT. § 12-507 (1956).
220. See articles cited note 210 supra.
221. Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958); accord Young
v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1957). But see State of Kansas v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., 426 S.W.2d 720 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968) (Kansas statute defining
commencement date of suit rejected, although Kansaslimitations period applicable.)
216, [Vol.- 33
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fiot'being baried by Kansas, suit- can be maintained in-Missouri by
p,222
An- extremely important qualification to the foregoing proposition must
be noted. Where the defendant leaves the State of accrual or "absconds,"
as it i§. sometimes put ih the tolling statutes, but in personam jurisdiction
may still be acquired by way of service upon his actual or constructive
agent (e.g., the Secretary of State), the statute in the accrual state mar not
be considered "tolled" by that State. Therefore, the Missouri borrowing
statute would bar the claim.
223
Exda ple 37: Same facts as in Example "36" except that the
tort is committed with an automobile. Since, under the Kansas
law, P could have obtained jurisdiction over D and begun an action
against him by service upon the secretary of state, the statute is
not tolled and claim is barred in Kansas. Therefore, under the bor-
rowing statute, suit cannot be maintained in Missouri by p.2
24
Another important qualification is that the "borrowing" statute does
Itot apply to foreign causes of action which have their own built in limita-
tions.225 Although the result is the same as though the limitation period
was in effect borrowed, the theory is quite different.
Application of such a foreign statute by the forum is not dependent
upon a "borrowing" statute. The time for filing of the action being
substantive, the forum applies it under general principles of con-
flicts of laws governing the application of substantive law.
226
Moreover, the difference is not entirely theoretical. Thus, whether the
action is covered by the forum's tolling or extension provisions depends
entirely upon whether the bar is applicable as result of substantive conflicts
principles, or applicable because of the borrowing statute.
22 7
Example 38: P sues D in Missouri for wrongful death occurring
in Kansas. The action is instituted within the two year period
222. Ibid.
223. Strickland v. Kay, 426 S.W.2d 746 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968); Haver v.
Bassett, 287 S.W.2d 342 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956); Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80 (8th
Cir. 1957).
224. Bond v. Golden, 273 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1959). See Smith v. Forty Mil-
lion, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 912, 395 P.2d 201 (1964) (surveying the different juris-
dictions which have dealt with whether the statute is tolled where service on a
nonresident motorist is vicariously available through the secretary of state.)
225. Owens v. Estate of Saville, 409 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1966).
226. Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Mo. 1966).
227. Compare Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., sutpra note 226, with Turner v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 346 Mo. Y8, 142 S.W.2d 455 (1940).
19681]
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established by the Kansas wrongful death statute, but dismissed
without prejudice following the expiration of the two year limita-
tion. Since under Kansas law the limitation period is built in to the
wrongful death statute itself, the Missouri nonsuit provision does
not save the action and it is barred.228
Example 39: Same facts as in Example "38" except that the
action is for negligence. In this situation the borrowing statute
applies. Even though the Kansas statute has run, it is a "Missouri"
limitation for the purpose of the new action. Plaintiff would have
one year within which to begin such new action.22 9
The exemption from the "borrowing" statute to which "built in"
foreign limitations are subject may some times work to the plaintiff's
advantage. In a wrongful death action, which would have been barred had
the Missouri wrongful death limitations period been applied, the action
was maintainable in Missouri because still maintainable in Louisiana. The
Louisiana "built in" statute was "tolled" by the initiation of a federal
court suit on the same cause of action.230
It is also established that a foreign nonclaim statute is not a statute of
limitations for the purposes of the Missouri borrowing statute.231
Exanvple 40: Iowa has a nonclaim statute which requires
claims against a decedent's estate to be filed within six months or
be barred. Eighteen months following the first published notice,
and six months after the executor of an Iowa decedent's estate has
been discharged, assets are discovered in Missouri and an adminis-
trator d.b.n. appointed. An Iowa creditor presents a claim in the
Missouri proceeding. Even though the claim is barred in Iowa, the
borrowing statute does not comprehend the nonclaim statute and
the claim is not, for that reason, barred in Missouri232
The borrowing statute disposes, in most cases, of the need to make a
distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" statutes of limitation.
However it does not dispose of the "accrual" question, which typically must
be determined according to the rules in force in the jurisdiction where the
228. Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1966).
229. Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455(1940).
230. Martinez v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 296 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1956). See also RESTATE-
MErNT (SECOND), CONFLIct OF LAws, Reporter's Note § 143 at 497 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967) (cases collected); note 213 supra.
231. Lipperd v. Lipperd's Estate, 181 Mo. App. 106, 163 S.W. 934 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1914).
232. Owens v. Estate of Saville, 409 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1966).
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claim arises.2 33 Thus, in one leading case involving an action to recover for
eye injuries attributable to defective drugs, the Missouri borrowing statute
was held applicable. Nevertheless the claim was saved because, under
Kansas law, the cause of action was held to have accrued at a time much
later than when the plaintiff first noticed a "yellow glow." 23 4 However,
where a Missouri action in federal court for malicious prosecution was based
upon false garnishments made in Kansas, the borrowing statute made the
Kansas limitation applicable and the action was barred, the claim having
"accrued" in Kansas 2 35
A wrongful death claim was generated by a collision in Missouri, and
a diversity action brought in Missouri by a Florida resident against the
personal representative of the deceased (the allegedly negligent driver).
Both the deceased and the personal representative were Kansas residents.
The Kansas nonclaim statute was not applied even though it would have
been applicable had the suit been brought in Kansas.238 This result was
reached because the cause of action was deemed to have accrued in
Missouri.
Similarly, in the exceptional case of Williams v'. Illinois Cent. R.
Co.,237 one of the few cases in which the Missouri Supreme Court was moved
to reclassify a cause of action in order to bring it under a longer limitations
period, 238 the cause of action (breach of contract) was held to have ac-
crued in Missouri where the railroad ticket was purchased, and not in
Louisiana where the train wreck occurred.
A provision in the Workmen's Compensation law provides that the
provisions of the Chapter shall govern injuries received outside the state
pursuant to contracts of employment made in Missouri239 (unless the con-
tract provides otherwise). Nevertheless the shorter Kansas limitations were
held to govern the action against the allegedly negligent third-party. The
Missouri Supreme Court emphasized that the original workmen's compensa-
tion claims were filed in Kansas.
240
233. See, e.g., Giambelluca v. Thompson, 283 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1955) (when
workmen's compensation claim accrued under Texas law); Brooks v. Nat'l. Bank
of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958) (whether wrongful death claim against
estate accrued in Missouri or Kansas); Brown v. Westport Finance Co., 145 F.
Supp. 265 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (whether claim based upon wrongful garnishments
accrued in Kansas or Missouri).,
234. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
235. Brown v. Westport Finance Co., 145 F.Supp. 265 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
236. Brooks v. Nat. Bank of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958).
237. 360 Mo. 501, 229 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
.238. See-text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
239.',§ 287.110, RSMo 1959.
,240. McLendon v. Kissick, 365 Mo. Z64, 250 S.W.2d 489 (1952).
'19691'
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-, , -Acquiesence in a status conferred by a foxeign jurisdiction does not
;always preempt protections otherwise available under Missouri law. In
Nelson v. Browning241 the plaintiffs, minors at the time, were persuaded to
secure an Arkansas court order which removed the disability of minority.
Following this proceeding the plaintiffs then entered into a settlement. They
;released the insurance company of the driver of the vehicle that.had in-
jured them in Missouri. The Missouri Supreme Court. had no trouble dispos-
ing of the technical arguments advanced by the defendants in support of the
contention that the statute of limitation had run. 242
Where an action is brought to recover damages under federal law, the
state statutes of limitation control uhless there -is a special limitation pro-
'vided by the federal law itself. 413
Example 41: An action in Federal Court in Missouri is brought
under the Clayton Act for treble damages allegedly resulting"
from D's violation of the Shermafn Act. The statutes of limitation
of the state where the acts took place will'apply under Missouri's
borrowing statute, although the Federal Court will not be bound
by state decisions classifying federaL, antitrust actions as actions
for "penalties or forfeitures." 244
The Federal Tort Claims Act2 4r, has its own period of limitations (two
years). This prevails over conflicting state law. 246 Moreover, it is seemingly
established that federal law determines when the cause of action accrues.
This rule is capable of producing widespread inconsistencies. This is espe-
cially true in the malpractice field where the state rules for determining ac-
crual points are so varied.247
It is possible for a given cause of action, which accrues in a foreign
jurisdiction, to be protected by both the foreign and the Missouri tolling
provisions.
241. 391 S.W.2d 873, 881 (Mo. 1965) (2 cases).
242. Id. at 880, 884.
243. Goodfriend v. Kansas City Star, 158 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Mo. 1958);
,acord, Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961); Annot.,
90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1963) (cases collected).
244. Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox, 113 F. Supp. 937 (W.D.
Mo. 1953).
245. 60 Stat. 845 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) (1964).
246. Hungerford v. United S.tates, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962); Annot., 21
A.L.R.2d 1464 (1952) (collecting cases).
247. Cases cited note 126 supra; Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 732 (1966). For a critical
appraisal of the varying state approaches to the accrual problem in malpractice
cases see Allen v. Layton,,235 A.2d 261(Del. 1967).. -.
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" Example 42: D commits a non-automobile tort against P in..4'
Tennessee, and leaves the state of Tennessee. P sues D in Missouri
four years and eight months hence. He suffers a nonsuit six months'
after initiating the action. Even though Tennessee has a one year
statute of limitation covering such actions, it is not picked up and
made applicable by the Missouri borrowing statute because the
defendant's absence from the state "tolls" the action under Ten-
nessee law. However, the action is covered by the Missouri borrow-
ing statute. It is, therefore, also governed by the one year savings
or extension provision applicable in cases of nonsuit. P has one year
from the dismissal in which to bring a new action in Missouri. 248
It will be recalled that the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit took a very peculiar view of the Missouri statutory provision which
limits the tolling and extension provisions of'Chapter 516. That provision
reads as follows:
The provisions of sections 516.010 to 516.370 shall not extend to
any action which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute;
but such action shall be brought within the time limited by such
statute.249
In Hellebrand v. Hochlter,250 the Eighth Circuit, in effect, hold that
the tolling and extension provisions of Chapter 516 never apply to an action
governed by a limitation period of specific duration, whether that limitation
is found in Chapter 516 or elsewhere.
Similarly, with respect to actions accruing in other jurisdictions, it has
been argued that an action governed by a foreign statute of limitation is
an "action which ... , is otherwise limited by . . . statute." Therefore the
tolling provisions within the sections designated as "not extending" to such
an action, including that which extends the time for rebeginning an action
in the event of a nonsuit or dismissal, are not applicable to actions vhose
limitation periods are governed by a specific foreign period made applicable
by virtue of the borrowing statute.251 Fortunately the Missouri Supreme
Court has not been misled by such sophistry. It held that the extension pro-
visions apply in a case where the plaintiff suffers a nonsuit even though the
action, under the borrowing statute, is limited by a specific foreign statute.252
-248. Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1957); of. Gaston v. Wabash Ry.
Co., 322 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
249. § 516.300, RSMo 1959.
250. 331 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying notes 178-182 supra.
251. Compare § 516.190, RSMo 1959, with § 516.300, RSMo 1959.
-252. Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455(1940). ,, - . : . I
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This. case was decided in 1940, but was apparently not considered by the
Eighth, Circuit at the time it decided Hellebrand. Had the 1940 case been
considered controlling, a different result might have followed in Helle brand.
Example 43: P sues D in Missouri on a tort committed in
Kansas. The action is begun within the period prescribed by Kan-
sas law. P suffers a nonsuit at a point in time outside the limitation
of Kansas law applicable under the Missouri borrowing statute.
The one year period of grace-within which P may renew his action
(section 516.230) is applicable and P is not barred even though the
action is "otherwise limited, by ... statute." 243
Caveat: this result would not follow if the Kansas tort were
'one created by statute and carrying its own period of limitation
* (E.g. wrongful death).25 4
Apparently the same rules applicable to cazses .of action accruing in
foreign jurisdictions apply to judgments of foreign courts when enforcement
of such judgments is sought in Missouri.
Example 44. P secures a valid default judgment in a tort ac-
tior against D in'Mississippi, and two years thereafter "registers"
this judgment in Missouri. Mississippi bars enforcement of judg-
ments any time later than seven years after entry of the judgment
in Mississippi. Eight years following the entry of such judgment
in Mississippi, and six years after its registration in Missouri, P
seeks execution against D in Missouri. P is barred even though the
Missouri limitation on the enforcement of Missouri judgments
(ten years) has not expired.255
Example 45: P secures a valid default judgment against D in
Wisconsin where there is a twenty year period within which to seek
execution thereon. Twelve years thereafter P seeks enforcement of
this judgment in Missouri. P's action is barred by the Missouri ten
year limitation on the enforcement of judgments, even though the
Wisconsin period is Iouiger. This bar does not offend the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution.=0
2$3. Christner v. Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry. Co., 228 Mo. App. 220,.64 S.W.2d 752
(K.C. Ct. App. 1933).
254. Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1966).
255, § $16.350, RSMo 1959. See. Stanford v. Utley, 341 F2d 265, 267-68 (8th
Cir. 1965) (referring t0 unreported decision).
256. § 516.350, RSMo -1959.. Northwestern Brewvers Supply Co. v. Vorhees,
356 Mo. '699, 203 S.W.2d 422 (1947).
[VoL.:3
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-:, The Supteme Court has avoided ruling 'upon whether a state statute
which prescribes a shorter period within which to seek execution upon
foreign judgments than the period available to the holders of forum judg-
ments offends the Constitution. However it has indicated that application
of the shorter forum period governing forum judgments to a foreign judg-
ment is not prohibited on that account alone.257
The situation is a little different under the terms of the federal law
governing interdistrict registration of federal judgments. State statutes of
limitation ordinarily determine the periods during which such judgments
are enforceable. However it has been held that once registered in the forum
district, a judgment entered by another District Court assumes (by virtue
of a federal provision which goes beyond being "ministerial") the charac-
teristics of a judgment of the state in which the forum court is sitting. For
this reason a judgment entered under these circumstances may be enforce-
able during a more extensive period than would have been authorized by
the laws of the state where the judgment was first entered by the federal
court sitting therein.
Example 46: Same facts as in Example '44" except that the
default judgment is entered by a Federal District Court in Missis-
sippi and subsequently registered, pursuant to federal statute, in
a Federal District Court in Missouri. Under the interpretations
given to the federal statute this judgment is now a "Missouri"
judgment, and enforcement is limited only by the more liberal time
limitations of Missouri law.258
Perceptive followers of the nuances of federal jurisdiction may note
that the enforceability of an "extra-district" judgment by a federal court
sitting in a state which would otherwise bar such enforcement represents
a departure from the so-called "outcome" test which is supposed to govern
interpretations of Erie v. Tompkns. 259 In this sense it represents an ex-
ception to the usual rule, and is consistent with the view that, despite Erie,
there is a rising tide of "federal common law."260 It is also interesting to
note that this exception on behalf of extra-district judgments was established
257. Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966).
258. Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965).
259. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
260. See Friendly, I Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common Law, ,39
NY.U.L. Rv. 383 .(1964); Mqrgan, The Future of a Federal Common Law, 17
ALA. L. REV. 10 (1964). " " % .
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some time before the case of Hanna v. Plwmer,26' widely hailed as a tuining-
point case in this area. 262
VI. APPRAIsAL
Six rather significant observations about the Missouri statutes of
limitation and their application in Torts cases are in order.
The first observation concerns the unnecessarily strict application of
the "capable of ascertainment" test in actions for malpractice. Legitimate
objections may doubtless be made to the extremely liberal "discovery" test,
which many jurisdictions have recently adopted. 6 3 However, an interme-
diate position between the discovery test and the -particular "capable of
ascertainment" test applied by the Missouri Courts is logically and socially
defensible. Such an intermediate position would establish the cause of action
as accruing at that point when the injury was first reasonably capable of
ascertainment by this particular plaintiff under the circumstances existing
at the time of the alleged negligence and thereafter. The intermediate posi-
tion would thus avoid exposing physicians and surgeons to unduly stale
claims at what may be described as the arbitrary "discovering" prerogative
of the plaintiff.264 On the other hand such in intermediate position would
avoid foreclosing a deserving plaintiff from a recovery solely because he
failed to detect or fully to understand the source of the injury- at an early
stage, even though it was technically "capable of ascertainment" at such
earlier time.2 5 After all, judges must wrestle with the "ordinarily careful
261. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
262. See, e.g., Comment, Hanna v. Plumer: An Expanded Concept of Federal
Common Law-A Requiem for Erie? (1966) DUKE L.J. 142; Note, 40 TrUL.. L.
REv. 202 (1965). For a highly critical analysis. of the Hanna case see Stason,
Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
377 (1967).
263. See, e.g., Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Allen v. Layton,
235 A.2d 261 (Del. 1967). The objections to the discovery rule are well summarized
in Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1203(1950) (but the authors argue in favor of the discovery rule) and in Fernandi v.
Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277,286-90 (1961) (dissenting opinion). " -
264. The authors of the comment, Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limi-
tations, note 263 supra, have suggested that the malpractice statute might well be
gin to run at the point where the plaintiff should "reasonably . . . learn of the
harm." Id. at 1204. Missouri apparently has no difficulty in applying such a rule
where it is a question of an interference with a property right, and the question
at what point the statute begins to run relative to the "nuisance." Lewis v. City of
Potosi, 317 S.W.2d 623 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
265. See, e.g., Allison v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1933). The Supreme Court of Texas has characterized the rule whicliwould
bar a plaintiff from-,recovery when he is unable to leafn of the wrongful act untiU
atter, the- limitations period has-* expired as "shockinj. ' Gaddis v. Smith, 417
S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. 1967). .- - .. . . - ,
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and prudent man" notiori whenever a negligence case is tried to the court,; 6
It is not unreasonable to ask them to apply a similar test in order to
determine the point at which the particular ifijury first became capable of
ascertainment. Moreover, the intermediate position is more consistent with
the general statutory provision specifically rejecting the notion that an
action should accrue at the time the wrong is done or the breach of duty
occurs.2 7 The argument that the phrase ".... shall be brought within two
years from the date of the act of neglect complained of . . ,,,2s as applied
to the malpractice action, indicates a legislative intent to save the otherwise
rejected test and apply it exclusively to the malpractice action is not
persuasive.269 More specific statutory language should be necessary to
resurrect a rule elsewhere discredited in the statutes. In fact, most of
the cases, including the one establishing the "end of treatment"' rule,2 7 0
although accepting a harsh "capable of ascertainment" theory, have not gone
so far as to measure the limitation period all the way back to the actual
moment of the alleged misdoing.27'
The second observation concerns what may be called the "Hellebrand
Heresy." 272 Although strictly not a Missouri case, the Eighth Circuit's in-
credible interpretation of a statutory provision obviously intended for a
limited application, 73 would render all of the tolling and extension provi-
sions of Chapter 516 inapplicable to almost every action at law. The hold-
266. § 510.310, RSMo 1959. Since, in Missouri, the appellate courts exercise
a greater responsibility for factual review when there is an appeal from a nonLjury case, the argument against confiding responsibility for resolving such delicate
fact questions to judges seems even weaker. See, e.g., Schmitt v. Pierce, 344
S.W.2d 120 (Mo. En Banc 1961) (trial court's decision not binding, but cannot be
set aside unless clearly erroneous-factual question of survival in a common disaster
'ituation); Rentfro v. Wheelock Bros., Inc., 3.64 S.W.2d 55 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).267. § 516.100, RSMo 1959. Missouri has been given credit for a "liberal" pogi-
tion which is not deserved. Compare, Developments in tlhe Law-Statutes of Limi-
tations, 63 HAiv. L. REv. 1177, 1205 (1950)'with National Credit Associates, Inc.
v. Tinker, 401 S.W.2d 954, 959 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).268. § 516.140, RSMo 1959. The phrase which arguably substitutes a different
accrual test for that established by § 516.100, RSMo 1959 was included in the
special statute passed in 1921. It was apparently designed to resolve the contro-
versy over whether such actions are ex contractu or ex delicto. Mo. LAws 1921,
S.B. 335, § 1919a. at 198.
269. See McCleary, Malpractice-W . en Statute of Limitations Commences in
Malpractice Actions, 9 Mo. L. REV. 102, 106 (1944).
" 270. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); McCleary,
supia note 269.
271. See, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966)..,
,272. Hellebrand v. Hoctor, 331 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1964). See text accompany-
ing notes '178-182 supra.
273. § 516.300, RSMo 1959. See, e.g., Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texag R. Co.,
346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455 (1940). _ I ",..
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ing is inconsistent with earlier Missouri authority.274 The Federal Court of
Appeals, at that time concerned only with the immediate problem before it,
was probably not aware of the implications of the holding.27 5
The third observation is that Missouri is reluctant to accord an unusual
classification to a cause of action in order to extend to it the benefit of
lengthier statute of limitations. Even one of the more notable exceptions
to, this practice (personal injuries in a train wreck actionable as breach of
contract of carriage)2 76 can be harmonized with the other cases in terms
of a few precedents classifying passenger actions against common carriers
as deriving fundamentally from contract.277
The fourth' observation is a caveat about special statutory actions
which carry their own "built in" statutes of limitation (E.g., wrongful
death.) 27 1 Such actions are not subject to the normal "tolling" and extension
provisions of Chapter 516. Many of the assumptions which can be inno-
cently made about such statutes of limitation may prove to be wrong.270
The fifth observation concerns the "borrowing" statute 8 0 and the
warning that it does not reach foreign limitations which are "built in"
the foreign cause of action.2 8' It should be remembered that an action
brought in Missouri on a foreign cause of action with a "built in" limitation
will not receive, even though it is a Missouri action, the protection of the
tolling and extension provisions of Chapter 516.
The sixth observation concerns the absence of any official or objective
reappraisal of Missouri's limitations picture. These statutes of limitation
establish a limited time during which an aggrieved party may seek redress
from an alleged' tortfeasor. They must necessarily attempt to strike a balance
274. Ibid.
275. Hellebrand v. Hoctor, 331 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 1964). Since the Court
of Appeals indicated that the complaint did not sufficiently invoke the "improper
act" tolling provision of § 516.280, RSMo 1959 in the first place, its observations
concerning the reach of § 516.300, RSMo 1959 can be regarded as dicta.
276. Williams v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 360 Mo. 501, 229 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
277. Cases allowing passenger recoveries'for mental suffering and/or humiliation
unaccompanied by physical contact are frequently explained in terms of the con.-
tractual, as opposed to tort, nature of the action. See, e.g., Gebhart v. Pub. Service
Coordinate Transport, 48 N.J. Super. 173, 137 A.2d 48 (1957) (dictum); Knox-
ville Traction Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899).
278. § 537.100, RSMo 1967 Supp. (two years).
279. See, e.g., Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); Note, 24 Mo-.
L. Rtv. 397 (1959); Note 35 N.D.L. REv. 171 (1959); text accompanying notes
52-53 supra.
280. § 516.390, RSMo 1959.
281. See, e.g., Toomes v. Continental -Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1966).
For a discussion of the practical consequences which derive from the theoretical
rule that the "borrowing". statute does no.t.apply to foreign causes of action with
"built in" limitations, see text accompanying notes 225-2'30 spra.
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between the social need to insulate men from the haTassment of stale claims
and the needs of deserving claimants for reasonable periods of time within
which to bring to the courts the demands, which our traditions say they
should be permitted to bring. -
Striking such balances is not easy. One may well question whether the
particular balances struck in Seventeenth- Century England, 282 even if
accurate at that time, can be justified today. In this respect, disparities
between adjoining states with arguably similar socio-economic structures
suggest that the present limitations system may not be as rational as one
would like it to be.
LIMITATIoNs PERIODS (in years)
Actions One Two Three Four Five




Libel & Illinois Missouri
slander- (libel & Iowa
assault & slander) Illinois









Oral Kansas Nebraska Missouri
contracts Oklahoma Iowa
Illinois
*Illinois will reclassify as a contract action in order to avoid short statute.
See Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
Chart Showing Different Limitations Periods in Missouri
and in Five Bordering Midwestern States28 3
While some rule may be better than no rule, the very arbitrariness of
the statutes of limitation presents an almost insurmountable barrier to even
282. 21 Jac. I., c.16 (1623). For a review of this statute and its present day
influence on Missouri law see Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 745, 190 S.W.2d
994, 995 (1945); 12 Mo. L. REv. 86 (1947).
283. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 15-16 (1957); Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1 (1950);
KSA 60-512, 513 (1963); NEB. REV. STAT. of 1943 §§ 25-206-208 (1964 Revision);
12.OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 95 (1960); §§ 516.120, .140, RSMo 1959.
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the most ingenious of judges.284 However logical the -defenses arid the--ex-
planations marshalled in support of arbitrary periods 6f limitation, -they
mawr' well be as out of phase with the present goals of our legal system as
the defense of "contributory negligence" appears to be.285
The statutes of limitation of any jurisdiction comprise an elaborate
and intricate system of rules which can challenge the analytical techniqueg
of the best lawyers. Until a sufficiently broad empirical study is made of
the consequences and attitudes generated within these varying systeis8s
we canibt know how desirable a balance any given limitation system
presently strikes. A few of the decisions herein discussed suggest that in
Missouri, at least, thebalance may not be particularly well struck.287
284. Urjder Professor Llewellyn's "rule skepticism" theory competent judges
are supposedly capable of fulfilling the "essential intent" of the law while simul-
taneously paying homage to the formal precepts of the system. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION 191-94 (1960). See also Rumble, Ride Skepticism and
the Role of the Judge: a Study of American Legal Realism 15 J. PUB. L. 251 (1966).
In the shift from the "capable of ascertainment" to the "discovery" test in actions
for malpractice, one can observe Professor Llewellyn's theory in action. See, -e.g.,
Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261 (Del. 1967). Whether this theory could overcome
the one year obliteration of the battery action in a situation where "wrongful act"
and "discovery" are simultaneous would seem to be of some doubt. B4 t see
Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co. 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964) (injury
resulting from "horseplay" characterized as "negligence" in order to grant plaintiff
the benefit of the more liberal limitations period). See chart and authorities ac-'
companying note 283 supra.
285. See, e.g., Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
286. Two superb examples of the type of scholarship seriously exploring the
extent to which statutory changes or programs in fact produce the results intended
are MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFAC-
TURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966); and ROSENBERG, THE PRErRIAL CONFERENCE
AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964).
287. See, e.g., Girth v. Beaty Grovery Co., 407 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1966) (all
parties are Missourians, but claim barred by the Iowa statute where the acci-
dent happened to take place); Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d
321 (Mo. 1966) (renewal of action barred solely because Kansas regards its
wrongful death limitation as "built in"); National Credit Associates v. Tinker,
401 S.W.2d 954 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966) (malpractice limitation begins to run from
time of act and not time of discovery); Hellebrand v. Hoctor, 331 F.2d 453 (8th
Cir. 1964) (statute ran even though plaintiff allegedly physically restrained from
maintaining action); Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958) (statute ran
even though plaintiff unable to determine identity of tortfeasor); Hunter v. Hunter,
361 Mo. 799, 237 S.W.2d 100 (1951) (statute ran because plaintiff was imprisoned
for life, rather than for a lesser term-hence claim barred after pardon and re-
lease); State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (En Banc 1944)
(no probate of will fraudulently concealed by undertaker); Woodruff v. Shores,
354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d 994 (1945) (statute ran from moment of confinement
under allegedly false certification of insanity); Krueger v. Walters, 238 Mo. App.
340, 179 S.W.2d 615 (K.C. Ct. App. 1944) (mistaken venue cannot support a new
action under the saving statute); Allison v. Mo. Power & Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771(St. L. Mo. App. 1933) (in personal injury action statute begins to run at moment
injury is objectively capable of ascertainment, and not when discovered by victim).
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